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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts regulate lawyers, including federal prosecutors,
by enforcing various constitutional, statutory, and other legal
constraints.1  Federal courts also adopt and enforce their own
disciplinary rules pursuant to rule-making authority delegated by
Congress. 2  To what extent, however, do federal courts have
independent power, in the absence of an explicit grant of authority, to
regulate private lawyers and federal prosecutors? Although lower
federal courts have long exercised power both to define and to sanction
1. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000) (codified in statutory notes) [Hyde Amendment]
(authorizing federal courts to assess financial sanctions on federal prosecutors); 28 U.S.C. § 530B
(2000) [McDade Amendment] (authorizing federal courts to apply state ethics rules to
prosecutors in federal court); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000) (authorizing the imposition of financial
sanctions on any counsel who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously"); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (authorizing federal courts to impose sanctions on lawyers who
file pleadings for improper purposes).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1989) (subjecting appearances by counsel to "rules of [federal]
courts"); 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1992) (authorizing federal courts to "prescribe rules for the conduct
of their business"); FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a) (authorizing federal district courts to adopt rules




professional misconduct, the United States Supreme Court has never
clarified the source and scope of this authority.
This issue is important for two reasons. First, most federal
districts have adopted local rules of professional conduct, either by
incorporating those of the states in which they sit 3 or by promulgating
their own.4 Unless these standards can be justified as exercises of
procedural or evidentiary rule-making powers delegated by Congress,
their validity depends on the existence of independent federal court
authority. Second, and perhaps more importantly, federal courts have
often imposed professional obligations on lawyers through judicial
opinions. When federal courts eschew the rule-making process, their
standards of conduct again can be justified, if at all, only by reference
to some independent judicial authority to regulate lawyers.
The issues are especially significant in the context of the
regulation of federal prosecutors, which has been among the most
hotly debated areas of legal ethics over the past decade.5 There is a
good argument that the standards of conduct for federal prosecutors
should be different-sometimes more restrictive, sometimes less so-
than standards of conduct governing private attorneys and state
prosecutors. 6 Who should impose the standards also is a complex
issue.7 Federal courts might prefer to consider these questions in the
context of evaluating specific allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
in litigation, which would lead to setting standards in judicial opinions
rather than rules.8 Whether the courts may follow this approach,
3. See DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, REPORT ON LOCAL RULES REGULATING ATTORNEY
CONDUCT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995), reprinted in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SPECIAL STUDIES OF FEDERAL
RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT 1, 4 (1997) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDIES] (canvassing
the local rules of the federal district courts).
4. See id. at 4.
5. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REV. 381, 384-85 (2002) (noting debates over whether ethics rules may regulate
prosecutors' communications with represented persons, issuance of grand jury subpoenas to
criminal defense lawyers, and use of deceit in criminal investigations).
6. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88
GEO. L.J. 207, 225-43 (2000) (explaining why the standards of conduct for federal prosecutors
might legitimately be different-in some cases more restrictive, in some cases less so-than
those governing private lawyers or state prosecutors).
7. Alternative regulators include Congress, the federal courts, states, or the Department of
Justice. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 391 (analyzing the issue of who should regulate
federal prosecutors).
8. Courts might prefer to develop standards of conduct in common law fashion via case-by-
case adjudication in areas where the propriety of attorney conduct requires fine-tuned judgments
in light of factual complexities and nuances. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 472
("[R]egulation that involves judicial supervision of prosecutorial activities on a case-by-case basis
typically is more precise in identifying misbehavior."); cf. Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Federal
Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK L. REV. 485, 530-42
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however, depends on the nature and extent of their independent
regulatory authority over lawyers.
To illustrate the significance and uncertainty of the issues, and
to explore various ways in which they might be resolved, this Article
takes as its point of departure the most significant recent case
addressing the question of independent regulatory authority over
lawyers, United States v. Williams.9 Some observers believe that
Williams has defined the nature and scope of federal judicial
regulatory authority. Two federal courts of appeals have recently read
Williams as foreclosing federal courts from using any authority,
including rule-making and independent regulatory authority over
lawyers, to adopt a rule of prosecutorial conduct that impinges upon
core attributes of the grand jury.10 A former Department of Justice
official has characterized Williams more broadly as foreclosing federal
district courts from imposing ethics standards governing any
prosecutorial behavior occurring out-of-court. 1  A careful reading of
the decision, however, suggests that Williams in fact resolved little, if
anything, about federal courts' regulatory power.
This Article demonstrates that the outcome in Williams could
have been reached in more than a dozen different ways. Many of the
possible analytic approaches would have resolved important open
questions about the scope and nature of judicial authority. Most of
these approaches are consistent with the actual language of the
Williams decision. Through its analysis of Williams, this Article
identifies the different potential sources of regulatory authority,
(1989) (arguing that, where disciplinary rules are ambiguous, it is preferable for courts to
develop standards in common law fashion than for them to attempt to glean the intent of those
who drafted the rules). On the other hand, rules may regulate more effectively by providing
clearer notice to prosecutors and the public. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 472 ('The
adoption of explicit general standards of conduct often promotes market regulation."). Moreover,
rule making has procedural advantages over adjudication, including the ability to hear from a
wider array of stakeholders and the involvement of more decision makers. See Bruce A. Green,
Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should
the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 497-99 (1996) [hereinafter Green, Whose
Rules] (discussing limitations of adjudication as a means of determining professional standards).
9. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
10. Stern v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 16 (1st Cir. 2000);
Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 110 (3rd Cir. 1992).
11. Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 355, 410 (1996); see also John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper
Scope of the Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 423, 464 (1997) (reading
Williams as holding that "the supervisory power of federal district courts should be limited to
fashioning remedies for violations of existing federal law and prescribing rules of procedure for
their own, in-house proceedings"). As discussed below, this probably is an over-reading of
Williams, see infra text accompanying notes 104-109, but it shows how malleable the Supreme
Court's decision was.
2003] 1307
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highlights the uncertainty of their reach, and notes the many difficult
and important questions that remain to be resolved with respect to
judicial regulation of federal lawyers (and especially federal
prosecutors). This analysis calls into question a host of recent judicial
and academic assumptions about the extent of federal judicial
regulatory power.
II. THE BACKGROUND PROBLEM
Most state supreme courts claim plenary law-making and rule-
making authority to regulate the conduct of lawyers whom they have
authorized to practice law. 12 Federal district courts, in contrast, are
supposed to be courts of more limited jurisdiction. 13 They have never
claimed authority to regulate all aspects of the professional conduct of
federal lawyers. They have, however, exercised both congressionally
delegated authority and independent non-delegated authority to
regulate certain aspects of federal litigators' behavior.
The congressionally delegated authority takes two forms. First,
federal courts have authority to enforce federal statutes and specific
rules of procedure that establish standards of conduct governing
lawyers generally or federal prosecutors specifically. These include
12. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 22-33 (1986) (discussing state
and federal court inherent authority to regulate attorneys); Green and Zacharias, supra note 5,
at 391 ("A state, however, may claim an independent substantive right to apply its ethics rules to
the work of all lawyers"); Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-
Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 362 (1998) ("Quite beyond
that, most state supreme courts also claim the exclusive power to regulate lawyers as the court
sees fit-even if the state's legislature has enacted legislation that on its face is applicable to
lawyers"); see also United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 226 n.2 (1967)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to state supreme court's "exercise of its common law power of
supervision over the Bar"); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1961) (describing courts'
traditional power to discipline members of the bar, incident to a "broader responsibility for
keeping the administration of justice and the standards of professional conduct unsullied"). State
rules of conduct extend not just to state-licensed lawyers' work in relation to state court
litigation but to all aspects of professional work performed within a state; for example,
negotiating business transactions, rendering legal advice, or drafting legal documents.
13. In most jurisdictions, state courts have taken on the role of regulating lawyers through
their inherent powers. See Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role
of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1989) (discussing courts'
inherent power to regulate lawyers). In the federal context, the courts typically have spoken of
inherent authority as existing only in furtherance of the courts' need to govern their own
litigation processes. See infra text accompanying notes 156-227. Because lower federal courts are
creatures of congressional fiat, and subject to jurisdictional limitations imposed by Congress,
federal courts traditionally have considered their authority to regulate lawyers subsidiary to
Congress's authority. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (quoting Ex
parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 511 (1874), for the proposition that "the exercise of the inherent
power of lower federal courts can be limited by statute and rule, for 'these courts were created by
act of Congress").
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14 and, for federal
prosecutors, the McDadeI 5 and Hyde Amendments. 16
Second, Congress has delegated general rule-making authority
to federal courts. 7 Although ostensibly limited to the power to make
evidentiary and procedural rules,18 federal district courts also have
assumed the authority to adopt local practice rules that govern the
conduct of federal litigation. 19 These rules have been used to
incorporate standards of professional responsibility-some original
and some following the standards of the states in which the federal
courts sit.20
The power of federal courts to apply such rules to federal
prosecutors is different, in some respects, from the courts' power over
other attorneys trying cases in federal courts. Federal courts may
have special authority to regulate participants in the criminal process,
including prosecutors. 21 On the other hand, the same Congress that
has delegated rule-making authority to the federal courts also has
delegated authority to the Department of Justice to engage in
particular law enforcement activities. 22  The two independent
delegations may conflict with one another, giving rise to questions
about which institution's judgments should control. 23 Moreover,
14. Rule 11 authorizes the federal courts to impose monetary sanctions, inter alia, upon
lawyers who file pleadings for an improper purpose. FED R. Civ. P. 11.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000). The McDade Amendment requires federal prosecutors to
comply with the ethics rules of the states in which they appear. Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1997). The Hyde amendment authorizes federal courts to award
attorneys' fees to criminal defendants who retained counsel to defend against frivolous or
vexatious charges. Id.
17. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000) (setting forth the Rules Enabling Act); FED. R. Civ. P.
83 (authorizing local practice rules); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (authorizing local court rules for
criminal proceedings).
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.").
19. For a full discussion of federal court rule-making power, see generally JUDITH A.
MCMORROW & DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT § 802 (2001).
20. The status of professional rules in the various United States district courts is
summarized in Coquillette, supra note 3, at 3-4, with specific references in Appendix II. See also
MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 19, §§ 802.01-.06; Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at
400 (discussing the status of local district court rules).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 25-31.
22. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (2000) (authorizing the Attorney General to "conduct any
kind of legal proceeding ... which United States attorneys are authorized by law to conduct"); 28
U.S.C. § 519 (2000) ("[The Attorney General shall supervise all litigation.., and shall direct all
United States attorneys [and] assistant United States Attorneys . . ."); 28 U.S.C. § 533 (2000)
(directing Department of Justice "officials ... to detect and prosecute crimes"); 28 U.S.C. § 547
(2000) ("[U.S. Attorneys] shall (1) prosecute for all offenses against the United States .... ").
23. See, e.g., Little, supra note 11, at 378-410 (arguing that the delegation of law
enforcement powers to the Department of Justice preempts the power of states and federal
VANDERBIL T LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: 1303
regardless of the desire of Congress or the federal courts to constrain
federal prosecutorial conduct, the Department of Justice is an
executive agency. As such, it may in some respects claim an immunity
from judicial regulation, even from congressionally sanctioned judicial
regulation. 24
As a general matter, the judicial rule-making authority and
other congressionally delegated powers have not proven controversial.
This Article therefore focuses on the less-defined non-delegated
authority to regulate federal lawyers, and especially federal
prosecutors. Federal courts have four possible sources of independent
authority: two well-recognized, two potentially controversial, and all
uncertain in scope.
The first well-recognized source of federal judicial regulatory
authority is the "supervisory power." Federal courts have most often
employed the supervisory power in the criminal context to establish
procedures governing the operation of the criminal justice system.25
The courts have used the authority to regulate the practices of a
variety of government agents, including federal prosecutors. 26
The courts' supervisory authority over the criminal justice
process has been the subject of substantial judicial and scholarly
attention that questions its existence and its appropriate scope. 27 The
courts to regulate federal prosecutorial ethics); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the
Ethics of Federal Prosecutors; Or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
429, 439-45 (1996) (questioning Little's position).
24. See Edward C. Carter III, Limits of the Judicial Power: Does the Constitution Bar the
Application of Some Ethics Rules to Executive Branch Attorneys?, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 295, 309-10
(2003) (arguing that rules like Model Rules 3.8(f), 4.2, and 8.4(c) violate separations of powers
principles when applied to federal prosecutors); see also Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 446-
47 (analyzing the separation of powers arguments); Zacharias & Green, supra note 6, at 250
(reviewing and analyzing the Department of Justice positions on separation of powers).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (exercising supervisory
authority to grant new trial after government introduced evidence of defendant's post-arrest
silence as probative of guilt); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("Judicial
supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of
establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence."); Burton v. United
States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1973) (cataloguing cases that have implemented the
supervisory authority); see also Green and Zacharias, supra note 5, at 411 (distinguishing
supervisory authority over the criminal justice system from a separate notion of general
supervisory authority); Neals-Erik William Delker, Comment, Ethics and the Federal Prosecutor:
The Continuing Conflict over the Application of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 855, 885-88 (1995) (discussing supervisory authority of federal courts over prosecutors).
26. Many of the supervisory authority cases involve federal investigators and other criminal
law enforcement personnel.
27. See, e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1996) (rejecting the use of
supervisory authority to grant untimely motion for judgment of acquittal); United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) ("[Tlhe supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to
suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third
party not before the court."). See generally Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in
1310
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questions stem in part from doubts that Article III provides a basis for
the exercise of supervisory authority in the absence of congressional
approval 28 and in part from concerns that judicial interference with
executive law enforcement prerogatives invades separation of
powers. 29 By this point in our history, however, most observers (and
certainly the Supreme Court and lower federal courts) accept the
existence of some supervisory authority in the federal courts. 30 The
question is simply how far it extends.31
The second well-recognized source of regulatory power is the
inherent authority of federal courts to protect their own jurisdiction.
Like the "supervisory" power, this authority has been characterized in
many different ways. Least controversially, it includes authority to
sanction lawyers for conduct in federal litigation that violates existing
laws or rules, or that is otherwise wrongful and disruptive of the
judicial process. The United States Supreme Court has long
Criminal Case: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of Federal Courts, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984) (analyzing the supervisory power and arguing for limitations on its
scope); Gleeson, supra note 11, at 466 (discussing the supervisory power and concluding that
"[a]lthough the temptation to supervise prosecutors is very strong, the power of federal courts to
prescribe standards of conduct for them is limited"); Matthew E. Brady, Note, A Separation of
Powers Approach to the Supervisory Power of Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REV. 427, 428 (1982)
("The Supreme Court has not clearly defined either the source or scope of this supervisory power.
Moreover, its future is uncertain."); cf. Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76
HARv. L. REV. 1656, 1661-63 (1963) (tracing the advent of supervisory authority and finding
difficulty in identifying the source of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority).
28. See Beale, supra note 27, at 1465 ('The Constitution contains neither an explicit grant
of authority to formulate rules of judicial procedu-e nor a full definition of the judicial power
conferred by article III.").
29. See id. at 1472-73 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-08 (1974), for the
proposition that "in exercising their procedural authority the courts must resolve the conflict
between the competing concerns of the executive and the judiciary 'in a manner that preserves
the essential functions of each branch"); see also Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the
Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV, 181, 203 (1969) ("[I]t may not be within the province of
the judicial branch ... to impede executive programs on the basis of [supervisory] judgments.");
Brady, supra note 27, at 428 (arguing that "the Court should limit the supervisory power
according to separation of powers principles and thereby exclude evidence whenever exclusion is
the least restrictive means to balance properly the competing needs of the executive and judicial
branches"); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L.J. 1050
(1965); Comment, Judicially Required Rulemaking as Fourth Amendment Policy: An Applied
Analysis of the Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 595, 615 (1977)
(discussing the "indefinite constitutional moorings" of the supervisory power).
30. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (using supervisory power to
overrule the silver platter doctrine); United States v. Mallory, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) (using
supervisory power to exclude a confession obtained after lengthy detention of the suspect).
31. See, e.g., C. Douglas Ferguson, Should the End Justify the Means? United States v.
Matta-Ballesteros and the Demise of the Supervisory Powers, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 561,
571 (1996) (noting that "the recent trend has been toward restricting the use of the supervisory
powers"); Comment, supra note 29, at 614 ("The supervisory power of federal courts is a concept
widely recognized but of uncertain dimension").
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maintained that, when necessary to enable the courts to operate
efficiently, 32 federal courts have broad authority to hold lawyers in
contempt, 33 require compliance with rules governing litigation,34 and
prevent interference with court processes.35 At its core, this authority
permits courts to regulate lawyer conduct that actually threatens the
courts' ability to process litigation and to maintain respect for their
decisions. 36
A third, less certain source of regulatory authority is the
authority of the federal courts to control the admission of lawyers to
practice before them. Today, standards for federal court bar admission
are set pursuant to the rule-making power, 37 but that has not always
been the case. Individual federal district courts previously claimed the
right to admit or exclude attorneys without an enabling statute. 38
Arguably, this admissions authority carries with it the power to set
standards for suspension or disbarment. This might include the
authority to identify unprofessional conduct-such as breaches of
fiduciary duty, violation of criminal law, or dishonesty-that might
fairly be said to demonstrate an individual's unfitness to practice law
in federal court. Carried one logical step further, the authority to
exclude or disbar lawyers might allow courts to define conduct that
32. See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944)
(recognizing inherent power to avoid "tampering with the administration of justice").
33. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873) ('The power to punish for contempts is
inherent in all courts .... "); Michael Scott Cooper, Note, Financial Penalties Imposed Directly
Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt Power, 26 UCLA L. REV. 855, 856
(1979) (noting that "the circumstances in which courts may respond to attorney misconduct by
invocation of the contempt power are subject to statutory, common law, and constitutional
limitations" (citations omitted)). See generally RONALD GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER (1963)
(examining the history of contempt authority in state and federal courts).
34. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987)
('The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that
the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other
Branches.").
35. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (referring to inherent
powers "necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases").
36. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (noting that the inherent
power must be exercised with restraint). See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,
42-44 (1991) (discussing the contours of the inherent power and its limits).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 ("In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct cases therein."); MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 19,
at 801-55 (discussing local rules governing bar admission); Marie Leary, Eligibility Requirements
for, and Restrictions on, Practice Before the Federal District Courts, in SPECIAL STUDIES, supra
note 3, at 123, 135-82 (empirical appendix setting out district court bar admission standards).
38. See, e.g., Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824) (upholding the authority of
federal courts to regulate admission to appear in federal litigation).
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must be undertaken as an aspect of competent federal representation.
In other words, lawyers who want to practice before a federal district
court would need to abide by the court's ground rules.
Finally, some lower federal courts have asserted what one
might call a "general ethics authority;" that is, an inherent authority
to oversee lawyers 39 (including federal prosecutors) 40 that is broader
than, and possibly distinct from, the supervisory power over the
criminal justice system or the inherent power to protect court
processes. In many cases in which lower federal courts have imposed
obligations on lawyers, it is unclear precisely what authority is being
invoked. But some decisions suggest that federal trial judges believe
they have plenary authority to regulate the conduct of lawyers who
appear in federal court, and perhaps even a power comparable to the
power of state supreme courts to regulate lawyer behavior within their
jurisdictions through rules of professional conduct.41  Despite
intimations in one of its decisions, the Supreme Court has never
recognized this broad "general ethics" power.42 The question of
whether federal courts have general authority to prescribe standards
of professional conduct for the federal bar, and how far that authority
extends, are important questions that remain open to debate.
39. See, e.g., Comuso v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 267 F.3d 331, 339 (3d Cir. 2001)
(upholding order sanctioning attorney for threatening opposing counsel during a recess, and
ordering payment of attorneys' fees, based on the "district court's inherent power to discipline
attorneys appearing before it"); In re Bailey, 182 F.3d 860, 864, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (recognizing
"that regulation of attorney behavior is an inherent power of any court of law and falls within the
discretion of such court" and upholding a public reprimand imposed by the disciplinary agency of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims based on a pro bono lawyer's failure to prosecute
an appeal diligently); Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 724 (6th Cir. 1993)
("Federal courts have the inherent authority to discipline attorneys practicing before them.").
40. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349,
1357 (1st Cir. 1995) (approving district court regulation of federal prosecutors); cf. United States
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (referring to the district court's invocation of "supervisory
powers to discipline the prosecutors of its jurisdiction"). But see Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 264 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Even less do I see a basis for any court's
'supervisory powers to discipline prosecutors of its jurisdiction,' except insofar as concerns their
performance before the court and their qualifications to be members of the court's bar" (citation
omitted)).
41. See, e.g., Weibrecht v. S. Ill. Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing
that "[t]he Southern District of Illinois has adopted Illinois's ethical rules as its own rules of
professional conduct, relying on both its power to enact local rules under FED. R. Civ. P. 83 and
its 'inherent power and responsibility to supervise the conduct of attorneys admitted to practice
before it."' (citation omitted)); Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1356 (holding that Local Rule 3.8(f),
restricting prosecutors' issuance of grand jury subpoenas to defense lawyers, was a proper
exercise of both the district court's statutory authority and its inherent power to control bar
admissions and discipline lawyers, which includes the power to "erec[t] reasonable prophylactic
rules to regulate perceived abuses by attorneys appearing before the court"); see also authorities
cited infra note 309.
42. See infra Part V.D. (discussing Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957)).
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In considering the application of any of the above powers to
federal prosecutors, it is important to note that unique separation of
powers considerations come into play. As instruments of the
Department of Justice, federal prosecutors exercise executive
di3cretion. When federal judges attempt to constrain, or set general or
prophylactic standards for, the conduct of executive officers, they risk
overextending their constitutional authority. 43
The potential limits of the ability of federal courts to regulate
the professional conduct of lawyers practicing before them and the
potential conflict between judicial and prosecutorial authority are
issues that, for the most part, have remained below the surface. Until
United States v. Williams, 44 the Supreme Court largely avoided
addressing any of the core questions noted above. In Williams,
however, the Court confronted a challenge by federal prosecutors to a
lower federal court requirement that federal prosecutors submit
exculpatory evidence to grand juries.45 Because the lower court had
not relied on its rule-making authority, 46 the challenge directly called
into question the extent of alternative sources of regulatory power
that federal courts possess. Depending on how one interprets the
Court's opinion, Williams may have significant implications for federal
court oversight of federal prosecutors and of federal lawyers more
generally.
III. THE WILLIAMS DECISION
A. The Williams Court's Holdings
A federal grand jury indicted John Williams on seven counts of
making false statements in connection with attempts to obtain bank
loans from federally insured financial institutions. 47 Williams moved
43. See Carter, supra note 24, at 309 (arguing that separation of powers "is violated when
the judiciary interferes with the exercise of discretionary executive branch powers by executive
branch attorneys").
44. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
45. Id. at 40.
46. The lower court in Williams relied on the following requirement announced in an earlier
Tenth Circuit opinion, United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1987): 'The Second
and Seventh Circuits have suggested that, although a prosecutor need not present all
conceivably exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, it must present evidence that clearly negates
guilt.... This is the better, and more balanced, rule, which we adopt." See United States v.
Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 900 (10th Cir. 1990), af'd, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) ("We have previously held
that a prosecutor has the duty to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury."
(citing Page, 808 F.2d at 728)).
47. Williams, 504 U.S. at 38.
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to dismiss the indictment based on a previous decision by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals that required federal prosecutors to present
"substantial exculpatory evidence" to grand juries.48 The district court
ordered Williams's indictment dismissed without prejudice. 49
Although the government argued that the particular evidence it had
failed to introduce was not "substantially" exculpatory-and that
question was evidently a close one-the Court of Appeals affirmed on
the basis that the district court's determination was not "clearly
erroneous."
50
The Supreme Court agreed to review the question of whether
the district court had authority to dismiss an indictment as a remedy
for the government's violation of its duty to disclose substantial
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.51 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
reversed. Justice Scalia's majority opinion, however, focused not on
the remedial issue, but rather on the substantive power of the federal
courts to require disclosure. The Court concluded that the Tenth
Circuit had no authority to prescribe a duty on federal prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory evidence to grand juries. 52
The opinion discussed several aspects of the non-delegated 53
regulatory authority of the lower federal courts. First, it acknowledged
that federal courts possess "inherent supervisory authority over their
own proceedings,"'5 4 which permits federal courts 'within limits [to]
formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or the Congress."'55 The Court held, however, that this
authority did not justify the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
48. Page, 808 F.2d at 728. The Court of Appeals had based this holding on its belief that
requiring prosecutors to produce exculpatory evidence "promote[s] judicial economy." Williams,
899 F.2d at 900 ('"[I]f a fully informed grand jury cannot find probable cause to indict, there is
little chance the prosecution could have proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a fully
informed petit jury"' (quoting Page, 808 F.2d at 728)). Other circuits had adopted this position as
well. See United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing disclosure
obligation); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); cf. United
States v. Vincent, 901 F.2d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that there is ordinarily no disclosure
obligation but implying there might be one in extreme cases); United States v. Rivera-Santiago,
872 F.2d 1073, 1087 (1st Cir. 1989) (same). But see United States v. Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354,
1359 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting disclosure rule); United States v. Hawkins, 765 F.2d 1482, 1488
(11th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 937 (6th Cir. 1984) (same)
49. Williams, 504 U.S. at 39.
50. Williams, 899 F.2d at 903.
51. Williams, 504 U.S. at 40.
52. Id. at 47.
53. Because neither the district court nor the court of appeals had adopted a formal practice
rule requiring disclosure, congressionally delegated rule-making authority was not implicated.
54. Williams, 504 U.S. at 55.
55. Id. at 45 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)).
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imposed in Williams, because grand jury proceedings are separate and
apart from judicial proceedings. 56
Second, Justice Scalia's opinion acknowledged the legitimate
use of supervisory authority to enforce or vindicate legally compelled
standards of conduct, including standards of prosecutorial conduct in
grand jury proceedings, but found that this authority did not imply
the further authority to prescribe new rules of grand jury procedure. 57
Because of the traditional independence of the grand jury, the opinion
explained, "any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their
own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not
remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own
proceedings."58 The opinion maintained that this limited supervisory
power "certainly would not permit judicial reshaping of the grand jury
institution,"59 which Justice Scalia perceived the Tenth Circuit's rule
to do. 60
Subsequent parts of this Article will discuss alternative
approaches to the issues faced by the Williams Court. But it is
important first to identify what the decision did, and did not,
expressly hold. Although the Supreme Court focused on "supervisory
authority," it did not make clear whether it was considering the
supervisory power over the criminal justice system or a more general
supervisory ethics power. The Court also alluded to "courts' power to
control their own procedures," 61 which arguably may have been a
reference to the inherent judicial authority. At the same time, the case
did not involve congressionally delegated rule making, and the Court
made no mention of the district court's independent authority to
regulate bar admissions.
Despite the ambiguities concerning the precise power on which
the Court was ruling, portions of the opinion clearly rest, at least in
part, on the fact that the district court had attempted to control the
operation of the grand jury. Justice Scalia emphasized the grand
jury's character as an institution "independen[t] from the Judicial
Branch."62 Indeed, the bulk of the decision focused on cases involving
judicial supervision of grand jury proceedings. 63 The Court therefore
left open the degree to which its ruling was based on the district
56. Id. at 47.
57. Id. at 49-50.
58. Id. at 50.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 45.
62. Id. at 48.
63. Id. at 47-55.
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court's excess in regulating the federal prosecutor's behavior (as
opposed to its interference with the independent grand jury's
functions).64
In dissent, Justice Stevens made this distinction clear: "The
standard for judging the consequences of prosecutorial misconduct
during grand jury proceedings is essentially the same as the standard
applicable to trials."6 5 Stevens faulted the majority for "seem[ing to]
suggest that the court has no authority to supervise the conduct of the
prosecutor in grand jury proceedings so long as he follows the dictates
of the Constitution, applicable statutes, and Rule 6 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure."6 6 The rest of the dissent, however, also
focused on the significance of grand jury independence for the
appropriate judicial rule, without identifying the source and extent of
judicial power to regulate prosecutorial conduct generally. 67
B. The Ramifications of Williams for Non-delegated Judicial
Regulatory Authority
Before Williams, the scope of federal judicial authority to
regulate at least prosecutorial ethics was very much an open question.
Despite the dramatic resolution some commentators have attributed
to the decision, 68 the Williams Court's actual holding is very limited.
Justice Scalia's opinion seems to address only the recognized
supervisory authority over the criminal justice system, not the other
potential sources of judicial regulatory authority. Moreover, the
64. The latter clearly was the Court's primary concern. Id. at 50 ("[Any power federal
courts have to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited
one, not remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own proceedings.").
65. Id. at 64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 66-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and
Enforcing the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 361,
361 (2000) (arguing that Williams in essence "transfer[s] to state courts and bar disciplinary
authorities" the debate over prosecutors' disclosure obligations); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial
Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1, 22 (1999); Ric Simmons, Re-
examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82
B.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2002) (ascribing to Williams a "complete withdrawal of judicial review of
grand jury presentations"); Ali Lombardo, Note, The Grand Jury and Exculpatory Evidence:
Should the Prosecutor Be Required to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand Jury?, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 829, 830 (2000) (arguing that Williams "is flawed because it diminishes crucial
rights of defendants and because it prevents the grand jury from fulfilling its protective
function"); Suzanne Roe Neely, Note, Preserving Justice and Preventing Prejudice: Requiring
Disclosure of Substantial Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand Jury, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 171
(2002) ("Williams impinges on the grand jury's historical role of shielding criminal defendants by




opinion confined itself to the special context of the grand jury, without
making broader statements regarding the judicial regulation of
prosecutors and lawyers more generally.
The way in which Justice Scalia drafted the Williams opinion
leaves the Court's ultimate decision subject to a range of
interpretations. The opinion does not offer a clear vision on the part of
the Court concerning judicial authority to regulate lawyers and
prosecutors. It is uncertain whether the Court believes non-delegated
authority exists and, if it does, how the Court conceptualizes its scope
or limitations.
Part IV of this Article sets forth a variety of possible rationales
for, or interpretations of, the Court's approach in Williams, each of
which is entirely consistent with the actual outcome. It remains open
in future cases for parties on both sides of the issues to argue any of
these positions concerning the general authority of federal courts to
establish standards of professional conduct for lawyers in federal
proceedings (including federal prosecutors). Part V then analyzes
three possible sources of this authority and their potential scope. Part
VI concludes by discussing ramifications of federal court reliance on
these sources of authority.
IV. ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL REGULATION
The Williams opinion is sufficiently imprecise to support a
variety of arguments about what the Court in fact had in mind. This
Part identifies four sets of possible interpretations of the Court's
vision. These include explanations that: (1) say nothing about the
existence and scope of federal courts' non-delegated authority; (2) do
not foreclose non-delegated authority but reject the exercise of that
authority in the Williams context for institutional reasons; (3) accept,
arguendo, the existence of some non-delegated authority, but suggest
limitations on the reach of that authority; and (4) reject the existence
of non-delegated authority.
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A. An Interpretation That Says Nothing About the Existence and Scope
of Federal Courts' Non-delegated Authority69
The Supreme Court might simply have believed that the Tenth
Circuit's requirement that prosecutors produce exculpatory evidence
in grand jury proceedings was unwise and that, therefore, the Tenth
Circuit erred in adopting its rule even if it had the power to do so.
That was the principal argument made by the government in its brief:
the costs of the disclosure requirement outweighed any conceivable
benefits. 70
69. There are two plausible ways the Supreme Court could have decided Williams without
considering the extent of non-delegated federal court authority that seem inconsistent with the
language of the decision. The Court could simply have ruled that the district court had
misapplied the arguably legitimate rule of the Tenth Circuit-for example, because the evidence
withheld from the grand jury was not in fact exculpatory. That was the argument made by the
government in the Court of Appeals and, in Justice Stevens's dissenting view, was the only
argument that the Court should legitimately have considered. Williams, 504 U.S. at 56-57
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Alternatively, the Court could have decided on remedial grounds;
namely, that the district court had no power to dismiss the indictment, even if it had power to
adopt the disclosure rule initially. See, e.g., Allison E. Beach et al., Procedural Issues, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1157 (2001) (interpreting the thrust of Williams as "severely limiting the
power of courts to dismiss an indictment in response to prosecutorial misconduct").
The argument that courts must limit their sanctions in order to avoid undermining the
ability of federal executive agents (i.e., prosecutors) to carry out their functions is consistent with
suggestions in earlier precedent. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,
254 (1988) (acknowledging some supervisory authority to formulate rules of conduct for
prosecutors but holding that "as a general matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment
for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants"); United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 504, 505-07 (1983) (acknowledging federal court "supervisory
powers to discipline ... prosecutors" but holding that "reversals of convictions under the court's
supervisory power must be approached 'with some caution."' (citing United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727, 734 (1980))). A remedial approach also would have responded most directly to the
question that the government raised when it asked the Supreme Court to review the case:
"Whether an indictment may be dismissed because the government failed to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury." Williams, 504 U.S. at 40. Under a strict reading of the holding, one
could argue that this, in fact, was the question the Court answered. See United States v. Myers,
123 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting the argument that Williams merely foreclosed the
remedy of dismissal, but declining to read Williams so narrowly); United States v. Sitton, 968
F.2d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting an open issue of whether "Williams has cut back on the
power of this court to dismiss an indictment based on the presentation of perjured testimony to
the grand jury"); United States v. Fenton, No. 98-OIJ, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9763, at *11 (W.D.
Pa. June 29, 1998) (interpreting Williams as foreclosing dismissals of indictments); United
States v. Lopez, 854 F.Supp. 50, 56 (D.P.R. 1994) (holding that Williams limited the district
court's power, in general, to dismiss indictments for misconduct before the grand jury). Yet the
Williams Court's statement that "as a general matter at least" there is no supervisory authority
to "prescribe... standards of prosecutorial conduct" in the grand jury suggests that the Court
was focusing on the substantive scope of the lower courts' authority. 504 U.S. at 46-47.
70. The government's brief stated:
Any marginal benefits from a rule requiring the presentation of exculpatory evidence
before the grand jury would be vastly outweighed by the costs such a rule would
impose. The task of identifying those cases in which the grand jury would not have
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This interpretation of Williams would say nothing about the
sources of judicial power, how far this power ordinarily extends, or the
constraints that limit the power's otherwise lawful exercise. 71 It
indicted if certain evidence had been presented to it would be an exceedingly difficult
one, in which the risk of error is high. Even assuming that courts could make that
determination accurately, the value to the criminal justice system would be
questionable. While the dismissals in a small number of cases might save the time
and effort of a trial, courts would spend far more time and effort in processing the
great number of pretrial motions to dismiss that the rule would generate, most of
which would likely be found meritless. Experience and common sense dictate that
there will be very few cases in which a grand jury that was otherwise prepared to
indict will refuse to find probable cause upon being apprised of the theory of defense
and the allegedly exculpatory evidence that is invoked to support it. Indeed, there is a
built-in protection against indictments that are subject to ready rebuttal by defense
evidence of which the prosecutor is aware: Prosecutors have every incentive not to
seek an indictment where the case has little or no chance of resulting in a conviction
when the full record is presented to the petit jury.
Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (No. 90-1972),
(LEXIS) 1990 U.S. Briefs 1972.
71. Although this approach would not significantly affect the law regarding the substance of
judicial regulatory authority, it would be important for a different issue; namely, the standard of
Supreme Court review when lower federal courts exercise independent authority to establish
standards for lawyer conduct. The Supreme Court has exercised independent judicial authority
(typically, "supervisory" authority) to tell lawyers, government agencies or courts how to act, but
the Supreme Court has not often passed judgment on comparable rules set by lower federal
courts. When it has done so, the question considered has ordinarily been substantive: did the
lower court have authority to set the particular rule? The Williams Court, however, might have
taken the view that the lower courts' inherent authority to make rules (regardless of the
particular source of authority) is derivative of the Supreme Court's authority and therefore is
subject to de novo review. See, e.g., Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 647 (1960) (assuming district
court authority arguendo, but reversing decision of district court to adopt local admiralty rule
requiring depositions); see also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64 n. 23 (1973) (explaining
that in Miner, the Supreme Court's "advertent declination" to incorporate a discovery procedure
into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure foreclosed the admiralty court from using its local rule-
making authority to establish the same procedure).
This is similar to the approach later taken in Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987), striking
down a local rule of the Eastern District of Louisiana requiring Louisiana bar members seeking
admission to the district court bar to live in or maintain an office in Louisiana. The Court made
plain that the district court had "discretion to adopt local rules that are necessary to carry out
the conduct of its business," and that "[tlhis authority includes the regulation of admissions to its
bar," but found that the requirements in question were "unnecessary and irrational." Id. at 645-
46. Nevertheless, both Williams and Frazier appear to assume that the Court may not strike
down a rule established by the district court pursuant to its regulatory authority simply because
the Supreme Court itself would not adopt the rule. The assumption seems to be that some
deference is owed to the district court, and therefore the Court may not overturn it unless the
Court can say the rule is "irrational" or that it was beyond the scope of the district court's
authority. See Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1361
(1st Cir. 1995) (deferring to the attorney-subpoena rule of a federal district court in Rhode Island
because "the district court is in a much better position than this court to evaluate the need for an
ethical rule regulating the practice of its officers at both the grand jury and trial stages"). This is
consistent with the deference ordinarily accorded district court decisions concerning attorney
discipline and sanctions. See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that the
"authority to discipline attorneys admitted to appear before" the district court is "a well-
recognized inherent power," and therefore it is not obvious that a court of appeals may review a
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merely suggests that the Supreme Court would have decided the case
differently had it been in the Tenth Circuit's position, for one or more
of the reasons that the government advanced.7 2 Language in the
Williams decision makes clear that the Supreme Court did not, in fact,
like the Tenth Circuit's rule.73
B. Interpretations That Do Not Foreclose Non-delegated Authority, But
Suggest That Institutional Considerations Foreclosed the Exercise of
That Authority in the Williams Context
Quite plausibly, the Williams Court was implementing a more
nuanced vision of non-delegated authority-a vision expansive in some
respects, but limiting in others. The Court might have been accepting
the possibility that non-delegated authority exists and, in theory,
encompasses the right to impose ethical obligations on private
attorneys and prosecutors. 74 But at the same time, in striking down
the lower court order, the Supreme Court may have believed that the
exercise of that authority was constrained by the interests of other
institutions, such as the executive or legislative branches of the
federal government, the federal grand jury, or the state courts. Below,
we discuss the institutional constraints that arguably precluded the
district court from adopting a grand jury disclosure rule.
1. The Primacy of Competing Executive or Legislative Authority
Separation of powers considerations arguably imposed an
institutional impediment to the exercise of federal court regulatory
authority in Williams for one of two reasons. First, the Supreme Court
may have believed that federal court authority was superceded by
executive authority,75 at least in the grand jury context. This vision
district court's disciplinary decision, but nevertheless, opting to review the decision under an
"abuse of discretion" standard).
72. If one adopts this interpretation of Williams, one can take the position that all language
in the opinion about federal judicial authority and separation-of-powers limits was pure dicta.
73. Portions of the opinion suggest that the Court was, in essence, standing in the shoes of
the lower court, asking whether it would have adopted the same requirement, and concluding
that it would not: "Over the years, we have received many requests to exercise supervision over
the grand jury's evidence-taking process, but we have refused them all, including some more
appealing than the one presented today." Williams, 504 U.S. at 50.
74. The Williams opinion itself suggests the possibility of broader authority than that
recognized in the case before it: "[A]ny power federal courts may have to fashion, on their own
initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the
power they maintain over their own proceedings." Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
75. Even assuming that federal court supervisory authority over lawyers "extends to
discipline of prosecutors," separation-of-powers concerns may constrain the exercise of that
authority because "federal prosecutors are appointed by the executive branch of government."
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conceptualizes federal prosecutors' activities in identifying and
charging potential law violators as an independent executive function
with which the judiciary has limited ability to interfere.76
Alternatively, the Court may have perceived a separation of
powers issue involving a clash between congressional and judicial
authority. The power of the grand jury and the power of federal
prosecutors, in theory, both derive from a delegation of law
enforcement authority by Congress. 77 To the extent judicial regulation
of federal prosecutorial conduct interferes with or purports to oversee
that delegation, the courts can be seen to be usurping legislative
authority.78
Ramos Colon v. United States Attorney for the Dist. of P.R., 576 F.2d 1, 6-7, 7 n.12 (1st Cir.
1978) (holding that a federal court could not appoint a private attorney to investigate alleged
federal prosecutorial misconduct in bringing charges without sufficient proof).
76. Prosecutors are subject to limited constitutional restrictions governing their decisions
about whom to prosecute. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 30 (1984); Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974). However, subject to those limitations, prosecutors have broad
discretion to determine whom to investigate or prosecute, and those decisions are generally not
subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[Tlhe
decision to prosecute is ill-suited to judicial review."); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171
(5th Cir. 1965) (holding that a court may not compel a prosecutor to sign an indictment voted by
the grand jury). But see supra note 1 (citing Hyde Amendment).
Depending on how one views the Tenth Circuit's disclosure rule, it may encroach on
prosecutors' investigative and charging discretion. On one hand, the rule addresses only
prosecutors' duty of disclosure to the grand jury. If one views withholding exculpatory evidence
as deceitful for example, by assuming that prosecutors impliedly represent to the grand jury
that they possess no significant evidence contrary to the proposed criminal charges-then the
disclosure requirement seems unremarkable. On the other hand, one might conceptualize the
prosecutor's decision making about what evidence to present to the grand jury as an aspect of the
discretionary decision concerning whom to investigate, how to conduct the investigation, whom
to charge, and what charges to bring. Under that conception, courts might be limited in their
authority to regulate prosecutorial conduct because of the executive branch's considerable
autonomy to make these kinds of decisions.
77. This, essentially, is the argument Rory Little makes with respect to judicial regulation
of prosecutorial activities. Little, supra note 11, at 378.
78. The question of whether a district court rule of professional conduct impermissibly
interferes with legislative regulation of grand jury procedure has been raised with regard to local
rules requiring prosecutors to obtain authorization before issuing grand jury subpoenas to
lawyers for evidence about their clients. E.g., Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court
of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1986),
vacated and opinion withdrawn on reh'g en banc, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987). Similarly, in
United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1125 (11th Cir. 1999), the court of appeals considered
whether a district court's authority to suppress evidence obtained in violation of a rule of
professional conduct was limited by federal legislation. The court concluded that the district
court's authority had been superseded by Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.; see FED.
R. EVID. 402 (providing that relevant evidence is admissible except where excluded on the basis
of another evidentiary rule, the Constitution, federal legislation, or a rule lawfully prescribed by
the Supreme Court).
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2. The Primacy of Grand Jury Autonomy
A second potential institutional constraint on the exercise of
non-delegated judicial regulatory authority relates to the notion of
grand jury independence. The Supreme Court has always considered
the grand jury to be a special institution which, while subject to
judicial control in some respects, 79 largely functions according to its
own rules and discretion.80 The Williams Court might have been
conceding the potential authority of courts to impose evidentiary
disclosure obligations on federal prosecutors, but foreclosed the
exercise of that authority in Williams because it interfered with grand
jury independence.8'
This approach is consistent with the Court's prior emphasis on
grand jury independence8 2 and certainly comports with the language
in Williams that focuses on the grand jury. In practice, the approach
would acknowledge federal authority to regulate lawyers in most
79. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that grand juries are bound by carefully drafted rules approved by the Suprem Court
and Congress that ensure the integrity of the grand jury's functions); Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960) (dismissing an indictment on the basis that the variation between the
indictment and proof destroyed the defendant's right to be tried only on the charges presented to
the grand jury); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (quashing a grand jury subpoena on the
grounds that it was unreasonable in its breadth and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment).
80. See, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1991) (holding that "a
grand jury 'may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers
appropriate, and that its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and
evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials" (quoting United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974))); United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (stating
that the grand jury "can investigate merely on the suspicion that the law is being violated, or
even because it wants assurance that it is not"); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 512
(1943) (holding that invalidating a grand jury indictment because it continued the investigation
past the date that the grand jury was to expire would "make the grand jury a pawn in a technical
game instead of respecting it as a great historic instrument of lay inquiry into criminal
wrongdoing" and noting that the grand jury is invested with broad investigative powers that are
not circumscribed by the technical requirements governing trials).
81. Numerous courts have interpreted Williams in this way. E.g., United States v. Igro, 974
F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Williams as focusing on preserving grand jury
independence); Lombardo v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 342, 361 (1992) ("the Williams opinion
reflects a recognition that the grand jury is an entity separate from the courts"); cf. Fred A.
Bernstein, Note, Behind the Gray Door, Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 590-91 (1994) (arguing that, in practice, Williams serves to reduce grand jury
independence).
82. See, e.g., R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 298 (noting that many of the rules and restrictions that
apply at trial do not apply in grand jury proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
343 (1974) (noting the wide investigative latitude traditionally accorded to grand juries); Costello
v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (holding that indictments based solely on hearsay are
valid, and that ruling otherwise "would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury
institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules"); Nixon v.
Sirica, 587 F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting the federal grand jury's independence from
the executive branch).
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contexts, but insulate prosecutors appearing before the grand jury
except in limited circumstances.8 3 The judicial authority would be
confined to facilitating the grand jury's work or applying legal and
constitutional requirements that constrain grand jury activities. 84
3. The Primacy of State Ethics Rules
Arguably, the Williams Court concluded that, as a matter of
comity, federal courts should not impose professional obligations on
lawyers that differ from those imposed by the states, at least without
a compelling reason to do so. Although Supreme Court decisions
acknowledge that federal courts have some independent authority to
regulate lawyers in federal proceedings, federal courts typically have
relied on state courts and bar organizations in admitting and
disciplining lawyers. For example, federal court admissions processes
piggyback on those of the states, and no federal court independently
administers a bar examination or admits an individual to practice
before it unless he or she has first been admitted to practice by a state
court. Similarly, although some federal courts conduct their own
disciplinary proceedings when lawyers engage in alleged misconduct
83. See, e.g., United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 988 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (D. Colo. 1998)
(applying Williams to foreclose application of a rule limiting ability of prosecutors to subpoena
attorneys before the grand jury, but upholding the rule in settings other than the grand jury),
aff'd, 189 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999).
84. There is a related way of interpreting the Williams Court's approach that highlights
this institutional grounding for the decision. It may be that the Supreme Court perceived the
regulation that the district court attempted to enforce to be a regulation not of lawyers or
prosecutors, but a regulation of the grand jury itself. Cf. Stern v. United States Dist. Court for
the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 16 n.4 (2000) (citing Williams for the proposition that "the
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that an otherwise impermissible rule of grand
jury procedure becomes permissible if it is enforced against the prosecutor instead of the grand
jury itself'). The rule, in essence, told the grand jurors what evidence they needed to consider in
reaching their decision of whether to indict, an instruction that seems inconsistent both with
notions of grand jury independence and of grand jury secrecy. When viewed in this way, it is easy
to conceive of the possibility that the Williams Court acknowledged the existence of judicial
regulatory authority over lawyers but still relied on institutional considerations to foreclose the
particular implementation of that authority attempted by the district court.
At least one district court seems to have interpreted Williams in this fashion. In In re Indep.
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, 986 F.Supp. 1144, 1151-52 (E.D. Ark. 1997), the independent counsel
investigating President Clinton through a grand jury process attempted to use Williams to argue
that conflict of interest rules could not be applied to his activities before the grand jury. The
district court disagreed, holding that these rules regulated Starr as a lawyer rather than the
procedures of the grand jury and that Williams therefore did not control. Id. Cf. In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 790 F. Supp. 422, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (distinguishing Williams on
the basis that a rule requiring a prosecutor to allow a grand jury to overrule his decision to
subpoena a witness furthers the "traditional relationships between the prosecutor, the
constituting court, and the grand jury" by "ensuring that the prosecutor not arrogate to himself a
decision that is for the grand jury to make").
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in federal litigation,8 5 most rely on state disciplinary mechanisms.8 6
Some lower federal court decisions have suggested that once federal
courts choose to rely on the state regulatory processes, federal courts
owe deference to the state decisions.87
Comity considerations suggest that deference may be owed not
only to state admissions and disbarment decisions, but also to state
disciplinary rules. There are good practical and policy reasons why
federal courts might defer to these rules.88 The prosecutors involved in
Williams did not have any professional obligation under state rules to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. The Supreme Court's
ruling in Williams thus is consistent with the view that a federal court
should not contradict the professional standards of the state in which
it sits unless there is a compelling reason to do so.8 9
C. Interpretations That Accept, Arguendo, the Existence of Non-
delegated Authority
There are several ways in which one might read Williams as
accepting the possibility of non-delegated judicial authority, while still
85. See infra note 232.
86. Federal courts usually accept state bar determinations that a particular lawyer is
qualified to practice or should be suspended from practice. See infra text accompanying notes
230-235. Although not universally true, when federal courts have made independent disbarment
determinations, they ordinarily have acted in situations where it was likely that the relevant
state bar would have taken a similar step when, and if, it addressed the lawyer's alleged
misbehavior. But see In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d 856, 859 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding the denial of
federal admission to practice even though state court admitted the lawyer in question).
87. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1103 (3d Cir. 1975).
88. Federal courts do not oversee formal disciplinary agencies and thus typically need to
rely on state procedures to administer admissions and disciplinary matters. A few federal courts
employ ad hoc mechanisms for imposing discipline, but they are in the minority. Cf. Grievance
Comm. for the S. Dist. of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting district courts'
use of ad hoc procedures to discipline attorneys); In re Grievance Comm. of the United States
Dist. Court, 847 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1988) (same). Fact-finding regarding a lawyer's general
competence and qualifications to practice requires investment of more judicial resources than
simple evaluation of individual acts of misconduct and it may require information that district
courts are not privy to. See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 418-32 (discussing in
detail the policies for and against federal court deference to state ethics rules).
89. One might envision a scheme in which federal courts could only exercise their
admissions authority in a way that piggybacks on, or is consistent with, state decision making.
Under this approach, deference would not be a matter of comity, but rather legally required
because of federal courts' limited jurisdiction.
Previous Supreme Court cases, however, suggest that federal courts do have admissions
authority independent of state requirements. At times, federal courts have exercised this
authority in a way that is inconsistent with the desires of particular state courts or bar agencies.
See, e.g., In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d at 859 (approving a district court decision to diverge from a
state's decision to allow a lawyer to practice). Williams expresses no intention to overrule the
prior cases.
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disapproving the specific regulation imposed by the trial court. The
Court may simply have been reaching a limited holding about the
exercise of the supervisory power over the criminal justice system in
the grand jury context. Alternatively, the Court may have believed in
the existence of non-delegated authority, but envisioned procedural
limitations on how federal courts may exercise that authority. Finally,
the opinion can be read as implying substantive limitations on non-
delegated regulatory power.
1. The Supervisory Power Invoked by the Tenth Circuit Could Not
Support a Grand Jury Disclosure Obligation for Prosecutors
Perhaps the fairest reading of Williams is that the Court
recognized a narrow limitation on one aspect of federal courts' non-
delegated authority:90 the supervisory authority to make rules
regulating federal criminal proceedings. Under this interpretation, the
opinion has some significance with respect to the supervisory
authority over criminal proceedings, but none with respect to the
existence and scope of other non-delegated judicial powers.9 1
90. See Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1359 (1st
Cir. 1995) (concluding that Williams did not foreclose adoption of a local rule requiring
prosecutors to obtain judicial approval for grand jury subpoenas issued to criminal defense
lawyers, because "Williams involved the use of a federal court's 'supervisory power"' while the
attorney-subpoena rule was adopted pursuant to the district court's power "to regulate the
conduct of attorneys appearing before it").
91. The arguments before the Supreme Court support this interpretation. The government
envisioned the Tenth Circuit's decisio.n as an exercise of supervisory authority. United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 56-57 (1992). The respondent, in language quoted by the Court, defended
the Tenth Circuit's opinion as being "supported by the courts' 'supervisory power."' Id. at 45.
Thus, neither the parties nor the Justices conceptualized the disclosure requirement as an
exercise of an independent "ethics" authority.
Nor did the parties ever argue that the disclosure rule could have been imposed pursuant to
some source of authority other than the supervisory authority. Cf. Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1359
(distinguishing Williams on the basis that its rule was justified only under the supervisory
power, in contrast to the "district court's power merely to regulate the conduct of attorneys
appearing before it" that was the justification for the attorney-subpoena rule at issue in
Whitehouse). There would have been a basis for them to raise this issue, because Rule 3.8(d) of
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, then in effect in most
states, required lawyers in ex parte proceedings to disclose evidence adverse to their positions.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1983); see also id. R. 3.8 cmt. (applying the rule to
grand jury proceedings).
The parties may have assumed that if the Tenth Circuit could not impose its disclosure rule
under supervisory authority, it could not have imposed the same rule under other non-delegated
powers to regulate lawyers. In fact, however, the Court's observation that "any power federal
courts may have to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very
limited one," Williams, 504 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added), was not accompanied by any statement
about federal courts' general authority to fashion rules of attorney conduct. Principles of judicial
restraint might simply have prevented the Court from considering a question that was not raised
by the parties.
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Similarly, the Williams Court's oblique majority opinion easily
can be read as imposing a limitation on federal courts' authority to
exercise supervisory power in the grand jury context, but as saying
nothing about the supervisory power in other contexts. The Court
specifically observed the following: that the supervisory authority over
the grand jury is "a very limited one"92 that a court should be
"reluctant" to invoke; 93 that this authority "would not permit judicial
reshaping of the grand jury institution, substantially altering the
traditional relationships between the prosecutor, the constituting
court, and the grand jury itself; '94 and that such reshaping "would be
the consequence of the [Tenth Circuit's] proposed rule."95 These
statements arguably reflect a recognition of the uniqueness of the
grand jury context and thus of an intent to limit Williams to
restricting supervisory authority in that unique context.
2. The Lower Courts May Have Exceeded Procedural Limitations
In striking down the grand jury disclosure requirement, the
Williams Court may have envisioned procedural constraints on the
exercise of non-delegated authority. First, the Court may have
assumed that non-delegated regulatory authority can only be
exercised through rule making, not through ad hoc judicial
pronouncements in individual cases. We have discussed elsewhere the
advantages of implementing restraints on prosecutorial conduct by
rule,96 either through legislatively authorized rule making or
otherwise. 97 Although the common law legal system ordinarily prefers
courts to decide issues on an ad hoc basis, when judges exercise a
general supervisory authority that purports to govern the behavior of
lawyers generally, their decisions become less fact-sensitive in nature
and more like administrative regulation. Under these circumstances,
the Williams Court might have envisioned that the promulgation of
ethics rules should follow an administrative model.




96. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 469-73. The benefits include the ability of
Congress or the Supreme Court to oversee the development of the rules, the ability of courts to
seek substantive input from knowledgeable institutions and persons who are less narrowly self-
interested than the litigants in a particular case, and the ability of the rule-making courts to
reach a decision when distanced from heated arguments in litigation. See id. at 474 (urging a
rule-making process through which interested parties can participate).
97. Of course, when courts adopt rules without legislative authorization, questions may
arise regarding their authority to promulgate such rules that are not equally applicable to
exercises of delegated power.
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Second, and conversely, the Court might have accepted the
view that federal courts sometimes may define attorney misconduct,
but also taken the view that federal courts must exercise that
authority in common law fashion-by focusing on the facts of the case
before them, not by making broad rule-like pronouncements. Under
this approach, for example, the district court in Williams could
properly have held that the particular prosecutor in question had
engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose important evidence to the
grand jury, 98 but was without authority to establish a forward-looking
rule.99
3. The Lower Courts May Have Exceeded Substantive Limitations
Perhaps the most interesting, and potentially most significant,
interpretation of Williams is that the Court implicitly recognized non-
delegated authority, but anticipated subjecting that authority to
particular substantive limitations. As discussed earlier, one
substantive limitation clearly can be gleaned from the decision:
Williams held directly that the power to supervise the criminal justice
system did not justify the district court's grand jury disclosure
requirement. 100 However, whether the Williams Court envisioned
further limitations, either on supervisory authority or on the other
possible non-delegated authorities, is less obvious.
It is plausible that the Williams Court implicitly concluded
that federal courts may not invoke any authority to impose a grand
jury disclosure obligation on prosecutors. Alternatively, it might have
assumed that the alternative sources of non-delegated power-the
supervisory authority invoked by the Tenth Circuit, the inherent
authority, 101 the lawyer admissions authority,10 2 and the general
ethics authority' 03-all are aspects of a single judicial power and
therefore subject to the same substantive limitations. Under either
scenario, the Williams decision would have broad implications both for
the existence of independent judicial regulatory authority over
lawyers and for limitations on that authority. The following analysis
98. Such a decision might take into account the prosecution's theory, the extent to which
the evidence contradicted it, how credible that evidence was, and the strength of the other
evidence of guilt.
99. This approach anticipates that a federal court's action can serve as "regulation" only in
the sense that it guides attorneys and influences future courts' decisions, subject to future case-
by-case decision making.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
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identifies several possible limitations that the Court may have had in
mind.
a. Federal Courts May Regulate Only In-Court Conduct
At least one commentator has taken the position that Williams
establishes a bright-line rule: federal district courts may regulate the
conduct of federal prosecutors, and presumably other federal lawyers,
that occurs before them, but not conduct that occurs outside the
courtroom setting.104 This interpretation is consistent with the
outcome in Williams because the conduct that the district court tried
to regulate occurred in the grand jury context. The Supreme Court's
opinion, however, provides no language supporting such a broad in-
court versus out-of-court distinction.
Proponents of this interpretation might find some support in a
theory of "inherent" judicial authority that is confined to regulating
conduct which specifically threatens the administration of the
courts,10 5 a theory of admissions regulation that is confined to
ensuring that only qualified lawyers appear in federal court,10 6 or an
analogy to the judicial power to punish direct contempt.107
Alternatively, proponents can rely upon separation of powers notions
that delineate the boundaries of judicial and prosecutorial
authority.108 The bright-line distinction, however, fails as a practical
matter to account for lawyer activity that occurs outside a judge's
presence, but that threatens judicial administration or highlights
lawyer incompetence to the same degree as in-court behavior.109
b. Federal Courts May Regulate Out-of-Court Conduct Only If It
Affects the Integrity of Judicial Proceedings
Some cases that have recognized an inherent judicial power to
regulate lawyers have rested that authority on the core right of courts
to protect themselves-to sanction conduct that abuses the sanctity of
104. Little, supra note 11, at 410; see also United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1091
(9th Cir. 1991) (overturning dismissal of indictment because of government's improper
investigative tactics on the reasoning that "[tihe supervisory power comprehends authority for
the courts to supervise their own affairs, not the affairs of other branches; rarely, if ever, will
judicial integrity be threatened by conduct outside the courtroom that does not violate a federal
statute, the constitution or a procedural rule").
105. This theory is discussed infra Part V.B.
106. This theory is discussed infra Part V.C.
107. Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873) (noting the inherent contempt power).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
109. For example, suborning perjury, bribing a witness, or failing to produce discovery
material to the opposing party.
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the judicial process and prevents the courts from operating in their
intended fashion.' 10 One can interpret Williams as accepting the
existence of some such authority, but also as anticipating that its
scope will be limited to misbehavior that actually threatens judicial
administration.11' Thus, courts could regulate conduct such as witness
bribery or subornation of perjury that impacts on the integrity of the
proceedings. But they could not impose rules such as those forbidding
a lawyer from giving advice to an unrepresented party, from
communicating with a represented party, or from misleading opposing
counsel, which are designed primarily to protect third parties rather
than to protect the integrity of the courts. This construction of
Williams, like the one distinguishing in-court and out-of-court activity,
seems unlikely, however, given how commonly federal courts regulate
attorney conduct for the protection of third parties.
c. Federal Courts May Regulate Out-of-Court Conduct Only If It Bears
On the Offending Lawyer's Qualification To Practice Law
One theory of judicial authority rests on the power of the courts
to regulate federal bar admission.11 2 Federal courts always have
assumed that they have some independent power to determine both
whether individuals are qualified to practice before them'1 3 and
whether lawyers should be disbarred from practicing before the
110. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991) (cataloguing the federal
courts' inherent powers).
111. This interpretation is consistent with the Williams Court's factual holding. The grand
jury proceedings that the district court tried to control had little to do with the court's ultimate
ability to try the case according to traditional processes after the indictment. Nor did the grand
jury proceedings involve or affect the ability of the government's trial attorneys to abide by the
court's rules once the case reached the court.
One might argue, as the Tenth Circuit suggested in Williams, that "judicial integrity" was
implicated-as when frivolous civil complaints are filed-if the concept of judicial integrity is
read broadly to encompass the interest in efficiency or the interest in seeing that defendants are
treated fairly. See United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 900 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987), and noting that the disclosure "requirement
promotes judicial economy because 'if a fully informed grand jury cannot find probable cause to
indict, there is little chance the prosecution could have proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to
a fully informed petit jury"). One might also argue that the requirement promotes the fairness of
judicial proceedings by reducing the risk that a defendant will be put to the cost and anxiety of
defending against unsustainable charges. Under a narrower view of the judicial integrity
concept, however, the case could still proceed fully and fairly before the trial court, whatever
happened before the grand jury.
112. This theory is discussed infra Part V.C.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 252-257.
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federal courts. 114 When federal judges sanction federally admitted
lawyers for misconduct, or prescribe standards of attorney conduct
outside the rule-making process, they may be asserting the power to
do so ancillary to their authority to admit and disbar lawyers. 115
Williams can be read as acknowledging this authority, but
limiting the scope of this authority to permitting federal courts to
prescribe standards that bear directly on the competence of lawyers to
appear in federal court. For example, a federal court might tell
lawyers explicitly, "remain sober," "don't steal from clients," .be
punctual," and "abide by pretrial orders and discovery rules." These
standards are arguably valid because they bear on lawyers' ability to
represent clients and help the court reach appropriate decisions.
Conversely, it would be hard to construe a prosecutor's failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury as suggesting anything
about the lawyer's character or fitness to practice law. The Williams
Court, therefore, may have concluded that the Tenth Circuit exceeded
its authority to regulate particular aspects of incompetence or
instances of misconduct.
d. Federal Courts Have Authority To Regulate Out-of-Court Conduct
Only When the Regulation Bears Directly on Lawyer "'Ethics"
The Court in Williams may have assumed that federal courts
have independent authority to set forth rules of ethics to govern
lawyers in federal court proceedings, but may also have found that the
Tenth Circuit exceeded this authority by treating its disclosure
requirement as an "ethics" rule.116 In recent years, the question of
114. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547 (1968) ("[D]isbarment by the State does not result in
automatic disbarment by the federal court. Though that state action is entitled to respect, it is
not conclusively binding on the federal courts."); see also infra text accompanying notes 234-235.
115. Typically, courts do not identify the basis for disciplinary decisions, because they
assume that their authority to discipline exists. Thus, the cases ordinarily do not reveal any
express reliance on the notion that the power to disbar includes the lesser power to sanction
misconduct.
116. It stands to reason that the Court would contemplate limitations, because recognizing a
general ethics authority opens the door to vast federal court power. One need only look to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to see that ethics standards can be used to impose
evidentiary and procedural requirements and to make significant substantive changes in the
law. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (imposing confidentiality
requirements that go beyond what the law of privilege requires); id. R. 3.8 (imposing a series of
substantive obligations on prosecutors); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223,
232 (1993) (identifying one goal of professional codes as being to influence the substantive law).
If the Williams Court envisioned a scheme of limited non-delegated powers (as it clearly wished
to limit the supervisory power), see supra Part IV.C.1, text accompanying notes 53-60, it would
have been important for the court to define carefully what "ethics rules" could encompass.
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what is an "ethics" rule (as distinguished from a rule of criminal
procedure, for example) has arisen in connection with the McDade
Amendment. 117 The McDade Amendment refers specifically to federal
court authority to enforce state "ethics rules,"118 and seemingly
differentiates such rules from procedural or evidentiary obligations
imposed on lawyers. Several lower federal courts have employed this
reading of the statute to confine the scope of its requirements. 119 They
have therefore made an effort to identify distinctive characteristics of
"ethics" rules.120
One conceptualization is that "ethics" rules must be generally
applicable to all lawyers, and not simply to prosecutors or some other
small subclass of lawyers.' 21 Rules uniquely applicable to a subclass of
lawyers, such as prosecutors, are too likely to reflect substantive
judgments about the criminal process that are within Congress's
exclusive jurisdiction to make. 122 Ethics rules, in contrast, should
117. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000). The McDade Amendment was adopted well after Williams was
decided and is factually irrelevant to the Williams issues, but the Williams Court may have
contemplated the same distinction about "ethics" rules that courts interpreting McDade are
seeking to implement. In other words, the Court may have been willing to accept some judicial
authority to regulate behavior that is quintessentially "ethical" or "unethical" in nature, but not
been willing to recognize a broader non-delegated authority to supervise lawyer conduct more
generally.
118. The caption of the statute identifies the statute as referring to "Ethical standards for
attorneys for the Government." Id.
119. E.g., Stern v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 14 (1st Cir.
2000); United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999). An
alternative interpretation of the McDade Amendment would be that federal courts must apply to
federal government attorneys all rules that states include in their rules of professional conduct.
120. For example, in Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d at 1287, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals identified the following "factors to help us determine whether a rule really is one of
professional conduct": (1) whether it "would bar conduct recognized by consensus within the
profession as inappropriate," (2) whether it "comes in commandment form," (3) whether, unlike
most procedural and substantive law, it is "vague" and "sweeping," and (4) whether it "is directed
at the attorney herself."
121. For example, the rule restricting all lawyers' communications with represented parties
might fairly be characterized as an ethics rule and applied, as it has been in limited fashion, to
prosecutors. See Green, Whose Rules, supra note 8, at 470-72 (noting that "[a]lthough the no-
communication rule undoubtedly originated with civil cases in mind, most prosecutors initially
accepted that the rule applied in criminal cases" but were uncertain about the rule's scope). But
see F. Dennis Saylor & J. Douglas Wislon, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The
Application of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 459, 477 (1992) (arguing
that federal courts lack authority to adopt a rule such as Model Rule 4.2 to govern federal
prosecutors in conducting investigations, because the courts may not "make or alter substantive
law in the guise of a local rule"). On the other hand, the "ethics" authority arguably may not be
employed to adopt a rule, like the one in Williams, applicable exclusively to prosecutors.
122. See Grievance Comm. for the S. Dist. of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 651 (2d Cir. 1995)
(suggesting that a defense attorney's efforts to gather evidence directly from a represented
witness or potential co-defendant "raises policy issues that should be resolved against the
backdrop of federal law enforcement concerns," and that if a choice is made to restrict such
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reflect more broadly applicable judgments about what constitutes
professional practice. 123 The district court's rule under consideration
in Williams arguably fails to qualify as an expression of a broadly
applicable ethics judgment.
A second possible conceptualization is that legitimate "ethics"
rules are limited to those having a primary impact on lawyers rather
than on other individuals or institutions. 124 From the Williams
majority's perspective, the Tenth Circuit's rule may not have qualified
because the Justices believed that the brunt of the disclosure
obligation fell on the grand jury, not the prosecutor.
e. Federal Courts May Proscribe Attorney Conduct That Is Wrongful or
Harmful Per Se but May Not Establish Prophylactic Rules
One of the core arguments within the debate over federal
judicial authority to supervise the criminal justice system is whether,
and to what extent, the courts may establish prophylactic rules to
govern situations in which no government misconduct has been
shown.1 25 The arguments against prophylactic rule-making power
include separation of powers concerns,1 26 concerns about judicial
competence,1 27 and legal arguments concerning judicial power.' 28
efforts to promote the represented person's interests over those of the defendant, "that choice
should be made either by Congress or the Supreme Court, and not by district courts' expansive
interpretations of disciplinary rules").
123. For example, judgments about the proper relationship of lawyers to clients, the courts
or third parties characterize rules of lawyer ethics. Cf. Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court
for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding a rule requiring prosecutors to obtain
judicial approval before subpoenaing lawyers for evidence about their clients; reasoning in part
that the rule's purpose of protecting the attorney-client relationship outweighed its incidental
effect on the grand jury).
124. Cf. Stern v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 19-20 (1st Cir.
2000) (striking down an attorney-subpoena rule, on the ground that it "impermissibly interferes
with federal grand jury practice" and finding that "though doubtless motivated by ethical
concerns" it was "more than an ethical standard").
125. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (distinguishing among various
Supreme Court decisions that establish rules which have been termed prophylactic); YALE
KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 488-89 (10th ed. 2002) (discussing the debate in the
cases between rules that rely on actual coercion by the police in interrogation and rules that
adopt an "inherent or irrebuttably presumed coercion"). See generally JOSEPH GRANO,
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 185-95 (1993) (discussing the author's objections to some of
the prophylactic rules adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, and in particular Miranda); Evan H.
Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic" Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2001)
(discussing "the energetic debate over the legitimacy of the Court's creation of so-called
prophylactic rules").
126. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, 124 (1985) (discussing federalism and separation of
powers concerns relating to federal judicial adoption of prophylactic rules); Susan R. Klein,
Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in
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The district court in Williams imposed a prophylactic rule
when it required the disclosure of significant exculpatory evidence to
all grand juries, even without a showing that the constitutional or
statutory rights of the defendant had been negatively affected by the
prosecutor's failure to disclose. The Supreme Court expressly found
that this requirement was not a valid exercise of the lower court's
supervisory authority. 129 In avoiding any discussion of alternative
theories of non-delegated power the Court may have perceived that
the disclosure rule could not have been justified even under these
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1052 & n.98 (2001) ("The primary
critique of prophylactic rules one sees in the literature, in addition to the Article III legitimacy
critique, is that such rules implicate federalism and national separation of powers.").
127. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 260-61 (2000) (allowing a departure from the
Supreme Court's prophylactic rule in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), on the basis of a
desire to leave to "the laboratory of the states" the "challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures"); cf. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1061
(1998) (attempting to demonstrate empirically that the partly prophylactic rule of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), interfered unduly with the ability to police to obtain legitimate
confessions); Klein, supra note 126, at 1060 (arguing that prophylactic rules allow the Supreme
Court "to change the rules by accepting alternate rules provided by Congress, state legislators,
federal and state law enforcement agencies and state judges, who may have better knowledge of
the circumstances encountered or facts on the ground, and who may be better institutionally-
suited to play factfinder").
128. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444, 454 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Miranda is a prophylactic rule and that, insofar as it is used to override
a federal statute permitting certain interrogations, the Court "arrogates to itself prerogatives
reserved to the representatives of the people"); see also Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken:
The Supreme Court's Failure in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 915-16 (2001) (arguing that the
Supreme Court in Dickerson acted lawlessly in preferring its prophylactic procedures to
congressionally approved procedures); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A
Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 178 (1988) (arguing that Article III does
not give the courts authority to create a general body of federal common law binding on the
states or a supervisory power over state courts); Grano, supra note 126, at 128-36, 141
(discussing the limits of federal judicial authority to impose nonconstitutional rules); Henry P.
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 n.112 (1975) ("But if
the prophylactic rules announced in these cases are not viewed as an integral part of the
underlying constitutional right, where is the authority of the Court to require that state courts
adopt a rule, rather than proceed on a case-by-case basis, and a particular form of a rule among
several arguably adequate ones?"); Thomas S. Schrock and Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1978) (arguing that prophylactic
rules are "neither constitutional nor common law but pragmatism without either precedent or
principle-judicial realism radicalized and rampant"); cf. Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained
Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from
Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 926 (1989) (arguing that some
rationales for prophylactic decisions are illegitimate because they merely read rights into the
constitution); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 194
(1988) (conceding a 'legitimacy problem" when prophylactic rules reflect "only a judgment by the
court that the world would be a better place if law enforcement officers were required to
comply").
129. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992).
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theories because they too would be subject to a limitation on adopting
prophylactic rules.
Why might the Supreme Court have limited the scope of the
non-delegated powers in this way? Because prophylactic rules are
difficult to enforce. 130  Because they risk invading lawyer or
prosecutorial prerogatives by including, within their prohibitions or
prescriptions, some conduct that may legitimately serve the lawyer's
or prosecutor's functions. Because they may replace lawyer discretion
with judicial fiat in some circumstances in which lawyers actually may
know better than the courts. The Williams Court simply may have
believed that non-delegated regulatory authority exists, but that
courts should be required to exercise their regulatory discretion
particularly cautiously when relying upon a general supervisory
power.
Under this approach, federal courts might be authorized to
sanction specific conduct by lawyers that is per se wrongful, such as
deceit, 131 or harmful, such as violating other persons' privileges, 132 but
not be authorized to make general rules designed to lessen the
possibility of the misconduct or harm13 3 (such as a prohibition against
communicating with represented persons).1 34 District court rule
making might still be possible, but would need to occur through
130. In other words, they at times so interfere with clearly legitimate law enforcement
activities that law enforcement personnel and courts find it difficult to adhere to them. See, e.g.,
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (adopting a public safety exception to Miranda);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974) (admitting a statement obtained without Miranda
warnings on the basis that Miranda's requirements were prophylactic and that the police acted
in good faith); see also Paul Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers
of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 303-13 (1996)
(discussing the costs of the prophylactic requirements of the Miranda decision); cf. Stephen J.
Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering
Miranda", 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 948 (1987) (criticizing the prophylactic aspects of Miranda and
concluding that "[t]he costs of the Miranda system to the public's interest in effective law
enforcement are great, and no progress in alleviating these costs can be expected so long as the
Miranda decision continues to hold sway").
131. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (1983) (requiring candor to
tribunals); id. R. 4.1 (forbidding false statements by lawyers).
132. Such privileges might include the privilege against self-incrimination or attorney-client
privilege. See, e.g., id. R. 3.8 (forbidding prosecutors from seeking a waiver of important pretrial
rights from unrepresented persons).
133. Rules against communicating with represented persons are, in part, justified as
preventive rules that assure the presence of counsel to help clients avoid being tricked or
revealing confidences. Cf. Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d
1349, 1357 (1st Cir. 195) (upholding a local rule requiring judicial approval of grand jury
subpoenas to lawyers as "a prophylactic rule [to protect confidences and attorney-client
relationships] aimed at, and principally affecting, prosecutors, not the grand jury").
134. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983).
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delegated rule-making power that is subject to statutory constraints
and exercised under congressional and higher court supervision.
D. An Interpretation That Implicitly Rejects Any Significant Non-
delegated Authority
Some of the interpretations discussed above would
accommodate the exercise of expansive non-delegated regulatory
authority to establish standards of conduct for lawyers in federal
court, but also would incorporate substantive limitations on lower
federal court power. There is, of course, another substantive
explanation for the outcome in Williams; namely, that any non-
delegated authority is narrow. Arguably, the Court believed that the
two non-delegated sources of authority that it previously had
recognized-supervisory authority over the criminal justice system
and inherent authority of federal courts to protect their own
processes-should be strictly confined. The language of Williams did
not expressly confine these recognized bases of judicial power, but
neither did it suggest in any way that they extend beyond the
narrowest reach identified in previous cases.
If Williams was indeed intended to imply a narrow reach to the
supervisory authority and the inherent authority, the question
remains whether, and to what extent, independent sources of
authority for judicial ethics regulation exist other than these two. The
Court did not foreclose regulation under the rubric of the admissions
power, but the Court's holding may have incorporated an assumption
that the admissions power did not independently justify judicial rules
of conduct for lawyers. Probably, the absence of any comment about a
broad "ethics authority" is most consistent with a decision to leave the
issue to another day, 135 but it is at least plausible to read the Court's
attitude towards the facts as signaling a negative impression of such
powers.
135. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 434-35 ("[It
is] the settled practice of this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, that it is only in
exceptional cases, and then only in cases coming from the federal courts, that it considers
questions urged by a petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the courts below.").
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V. THEORIES OF FEDERAL COURT AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH
STANDARDS OF LAWYER CONDUCT
A. Preliminary Observations About Federal Court Authority To
Establish Standards of Lawyer Conduct
The most interesting and important of the questions left
unresolved in Williams is whether and to what extent federal courts
have independent authority to establish standards of conduct for
lawyers in federal proceedings. Some interpretations of Williams,
such as those limiting the reach of federal judicial regulatory power to
in-court conduct 136 or to conduct that highlights a lawyer's unfitness to
practice, 137 assume that the Court envisioned limitations on particular
theories of judicial regulatory power. 138 The Williams Court's holding,
however, treats the Tenth Circuit's disclosure requirement simply as
an exercise of its supervisory authority over the criminal process. The
parties did not raise, and the Court did not discuss, whether the
requirement could have been imposed pursuant to other sources of
authority. 139
Suppose, therefore, that a federal district court, after Williams,
decreed the following:
Pursuant to the independent power of federal courts to
regulate the ethics of lawyers in federal proceedings, we
declare that all lawyers in ex parte proceedings in this
federal district must inform the fact finder of all
136. See supra text accompanying notes 104-109.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 112-115.
138. For example, the Court may have envisioned limits on the inherent power or admissions
authority.
139. Following Williams, the Department of Justice presented this question more squarely in
a declaratory judgment action against the Colorado Supreme Court. United States v. Colo.
Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1996). The action challenged the potential
application of Rule 3.3(d) of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, which required the
disclosure of adverse facts in ex parte proceedings. Id. at 1164-65. Rule 3.3(d) would have
applied to federal prosecutors in Colorado under a District of Colorado local rule providing that
the Colorado state ethics rules apply to lawyers in Colorado federal court proceedings. Id. at
1163. A Comment to Rule 3.8 of the Colorado rules stated that the disclosure requirement
should apply in grand jury proceedings. Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court's
ruling that the Department of Justice lacked standing and remanded the case. Id. at 1167. If the
merits of the government's challenge had been adjudicated, the court would likely have been
forced to consider whether the district court could impose the disclosure requirement under
either the rule-making authority delegated by Congress or under its independent authority to set
ethics standards for lawyers in federal cases. The case, however, became moot when the Colorado
Supreme Court amended its rules of conduct to delete the comment applying the disclosure
provision in grand jury proceedings. United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 988 F. Supp. 1368,
1369 (D. Colo. 1998), aff'd, 189 F.3rd 1281 (10th Cir. 1999).
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material facts known to be adverse to the lawyer's
position. Furthermore, since grand jury proceedings are
ex parte, this obligation requires prosecutors seeking an
indictment in this district to disclose to the grand jury
any evidence known to be substantially exculpatory.
Would the hypothetical court's reliance on a general ethics authority
justify the court rule that the Williams Court rejected when it was
adopted on a different basis?
The Williams Court was no doubt cognizant of the fact that
lower federal courts have at least some independent power to regulate
lawyers. Like state courts, they may admit and disbar lawyers and
sanction lawyers for some types of misconduct. The question is
whether federal courts also have non-delegated authority to set
standards of conduct for lawyers and, if so, how the scope of that
authority compares to that of a state supreme court to set standards of
professional conduct for lawyers it admits to practice.
Whatever authority federal courts possess is likely to be
narrower than that of state courts in at least one respect. Most state
courts interpret their state constitutions as rendering judicial
authority to regulate lawyers preemptive, if not exclusive. 140 In other
words, state court regulation trumps efforts by a state legislature or
executive to regulate the professional conduct of lawyers. The
alternative regulators may be foreclosed even from attempting to
regulate aspects of lawyer conduct interstitially. 141
140. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 12, at 22-31 (discussing the inherent powers of
state courts to regulate lawyers, and observing that most courts "assert a negative aspect" of the
inherent powers doctrine, which "asserts that only the courts, and the legislative or executive
branches of government, may regulate the practice of law").
141. The question of precisely how regulatory authority over lawyers is divided between
state judiciaries and legislatures has been debated in the case law and commentary for years,
but remains unsettled. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Courts' Power over Admission and Disbarment,
4 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9-16 (1925) (noting that some courts contend that the power to regulate lawyers
is "vested exclusively in the courts" while others recognize "a sort of dual jurisdiction, holding
generally that while the power of admission and discipline is judicial, yet the legislature may
prescribe reasonable regulations which the court will acquiesce in"); Leroy Jeffers, Government of
the Legal Profession: An Inherent Judicial Power Approach, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 385, 397-99 (1978)
("The predominant line of cases holds that the supreme court of the state has inherent power to
establish a unified bar and to govern the practice of law"); Blewett Lee, The Constitutional Power
of the Courts over Admission to the Bar, 13 HARv. L. REV. 233, 249-50 (1899) (arguing that "the
powers of admission and disbarment are necessarily inseparable and equally inherent in courts
of justice"); Charles A. Degnan, Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of Powers, 7 UTAH
L. REV. 82, 82 (1961) ("[Flew jurisdictions totally deny legislative competence in [regulating
lawyers], practically all agree that the primary regulator is the judiciary, and that it has the last
word on the subject."); Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of
Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783, 784 (1976) ("[L]egislative regulation of the
profession has existed concomitantly [with judicial regulation], and the boundary between the
two prerogatives has remained remarkably ill defined.") (hereinafter Note, Inherent Power);
1338 [Vol. 56: 1303
2003] AUTHORITY TO REGULATE LAWYERS 1339
In contrast, federal courts likely have less autonomy than state
courts. Their authority to establish rules of conduct is certainly not
exclusive; Congress can pass laws that regulate lawyers in federal
proceedings. 142 Nor is federal judicial authority preclusive; at least in
some areas, Congress can restrict the exercise of non-delegated powers
by federal courts. 143 The federal executive branch also may have some
authority to curtail or supplant the exercise of judicial authority. 144
The question left open by Williams, then, is whether and to
what extent (and subject to separation of powers limitations) federal
courts have independent power to establish standards of conduct for
lawyers in federal proceedings. Various lower court decisions assume
that federal courts do possess this authority. An example is the First
Circuit's 1995 decision upholding a Rhode Island district court rule of
professional conduct that required prosecutors to obtain judicial
approval before subpoenaing an attorney to testify about a client.1 45
The court found that the rule was authorized not only pursuant to
legislatively granted rule-making power, but also pursuant to a
judicial power "inherent in derivation ... [to] erec[t] reasonable
prophylactic rules to regulate perceived abuses by attorneys appearing
before the court."1 46
Similarly, many of the federal decisions disqualifying lawyers
for alleged conflicts of interest appear to assume that federal courts
have some non-delegated authority to set standards of practice. 147
Note, Legislative or Judicial Control of Attorneys, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 103, 106.10 (1939)
(describing a difference of opinion regarding the scope of the New York Supreme Court of
Appeals' authority to regulate lawyers).
142. See MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 19, § 801.02[5] (discussing congressional
power to regulate federal attorney conduct).
143. Because Article III of the U.S. Constitution subjects the jurisdiction of federal courts to
congressional control, the courts typically have assumed that Congress has plenary power to
supplant court-made rules. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991)
(subordinating the exercise of inherent federal court power to congressional oversight); Ex parte
Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 302 (1882) (recognizing that "[t]he power to punish for contempt-a power
necessarily incident to all courts for the preservation of order and decorum in their presence-
was formerly so often abused for the purpose of gratifying personal dislikes, as to cause general
complaint, and lead to [federal] legislation defining the power and designating the cases in which
it might be exercised"); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 337
(1994) (noting Congress's authority to establish national ethics rules).
144. Cf. Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 381 (1866) (holding that the President's issuance of a
pardon to an attorney who participated in the Rebellion foreclosed a federal court, relying on
federal legislation, from disbarring him for that role).
145. Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1351-52 (1st
Cir. 1995).
146. Id. at 1356.
147. Federal courts have characterized their authority to disqualify counsel in various ways.
E.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 470, 484 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the district court's power
to disqualify counsel arises out of its "responsibility for supervision of the members of its bar");
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Most federal courts do not act as if they are limited to applying pre-
existing legal standards, such as those established by state codes of
ethics or agency law, in determining what constitutes an
impermissible conflict of interest. 148 Instead, they have developed
standards themselves in a "common law" fashion. 149 Cases in which
federal courts have developed common law standards raise two
questions. First, do the courts have authority to proceed in this way,
or should they instead be required to rely on state or congressionally
authorized rules governing conflicts of interest?150 Second, if federal
courts have the authority to establish independent conflict of interest
standards for federal litigation, may Congress supercede those
standards?
The case law suggests three possible theories to support federal
judicial adoption of standards of lawyer conduct, even absent a
congressional grant of authority. The first two derive from powers that
federal courts unquestionably possess: the inherent authority to
regulate federal judicial proceedings and sanction lawyers for
misconduct in connection with federal proceedings 15' and the
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that
the "standard for attorney disqualification" relates "to a district court's power to supervise and to
conduct local operating procedure"); Tingley Sys., Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., No. 95-10284-
RCL, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13334, at *2 (D. Mass. July 25, 1997) (referring to the district
court's duty "as a supervisor of attorney conduct.., to ensure that the attorneys appearing
before it adhere to appropriate standards of professional conduct" and also referring to the
court's "inherent authority to disqualify attorneys"); United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282,
287 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (referring to the "exercise of the court's supervisory powers to disqualify" an
attorney with a conflict of interest).
148. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
a disqualification motion "must be determined by standards developed under federal law"); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1316 (3d Cir. 1993) ('The ethical standards imposed upon
attorneys in federal court are a matter of federal law.").
149. A good example is the line of cases, beginning with District Judge Weinfeld's famous
opinion in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
developing the standard governing the disqualification of lawyers who appear against their
former clients. See, e.g., Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977); NCK Org., Ltd. v.
Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754-57 (2d Cir. 1975); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571-72 (2d Cir.
1975); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-73 (2d Cir. 1973). Other examples
include cases involving criminal defense lawyers' conflicts of interest and those involving
conflicts of interest in class actions. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest In Litigation: The
Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 77-78 (1996) ("[C]ourts rely on the conflict rules to
varying degrees .... [I]n certain classes of cases, conflict rules are largely ignored by most
courts.").
150. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 328-329, some federal courts have taken the
position that federalism and preemption considerations prevent state rules from governing the
practice of lawyers appearing in federal court.
151. For example, in Dale M. v. Bd. of Educ., 282 F.3d 984, 985-86 (7th Cir. 2002), the court
of appeals recently held that the district court had inherent authority to order counsel to return
fees to the defendant after the court of appeals reversed the plaintiffs judgment and the award
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authority to admit lawyers to practice, or to disbar lawyers from
appearing, in federal court. 152 Insofar as federal authority to adopt
professional standards rests on either of these theories, the scope of
the courts' authority to regulate lawyer conduct may be significantly
more limited than the parallel authority of state courts.15 3
The third, more sweeping theory is that the power to set
standards of conduct is part and parcel of the general ethics authority
discussed above154-a broad independent authority to regulate
lawyers. This theory posits that federal court control over federal
litigators has the same elements as state-court control of state-
supervised lawyers. The theory, if accepted, would support federal
courts not only in admitting and disciplining lawyers, but also in
setting general standards for professional conduct in connection with
federal proceedings. 155
of attorneys' fees in a lawsuit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Judge
Posner's opinion referred to federal courts' "broad power, deemed 'inherent' in the sense that its
existence does not depend on an explicit grant of power in a statute or other formal enactment, to
regulate the conduct of the lawyers who practice before them." Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991)). This regulatory authority, he suggested, "extends to any
unprofessional conduct." Id. at 986; see also In re Poole, 222 F.3d 618, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In
short, 'a federal court has the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys
who appear before it.' . . . Pursuant to their exclusive authority over members of their bar,
federal courts have promulgated local rules pertaining to admission and discipline." (quoting
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43)).
152. For example, the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 302 (1882),
which upheld a federal court's disbarment of an attorney who had participated in a lynching,
contained a lengthy discussion of "the relations between attorneys ... and the courts" and the
power of courts over attorneys. The discussion referred to the lawyer's obligation, upon
admission to the bar, to take an oath expressing his duties, including a duty to "conform to the
rules prescribed by [the courts] for his conduct in the management of causes." Id. at 304. It also
acknowledged the court's power to ensure compliance with this obligation, among others. Id. at
303. The suggestion is that the federal court's power to admit individuals "as officers of the
court" and to disbar them from practice before the federal court implies the power to establish
the standards of their conduct before the court. Id. This argument was expressed more clearly by
the First Circuit in Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349,
1356 (1st Cir. 1995), as follows: "Whether considered statutory or inherent in derivation, we have
little difficulty concluding that the greater power of disbarring attorneys for unethical behavior
necessarily includes the lesser power of erecting reasonable prophylactic rules to regulate
perceived abuses by attorneys appearing before the court." See also Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 9, 13-14 (1857) (indicating that courts have authority to prescribe rules for the
admission of attorneys and their removal, including the offenses for which an attorney may be
removed, and that a Minnesota statute describing some offenses for which attorneys may be
removed did not materially narrow the court's discretion).
153. See infra Parts V.B.2, V.C.2.
154. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
155. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957) (discussed infra Part V.C); see also
Howell v. State Bar, 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Since the early days of English common
law, it has been widely recognized that courts possess the inherent power to regulate the conduct
of attorneys who practice before them and to discipline or disbar such of those attorneys as are
guilty of unprofessional conduct."); Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the
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The viability of the three theories ultimately has significance
not only for the scope of federal judicial authority to regulate lawyer
conduct through ad hoc judicial decision making, as in the
disqualification cases or situations such as Williams, but also for the
scope of federal court rule making. Although many federal courts have
adopted either an entire state code of ethics or the American Bar
Association's model code, it is uncertain whether each provision in
those codes could legitimately be adopted under congressionally
delegated rule-making authority. If federal courts are not able to
adopt such provisions under congressionally delegated authority, it is
important to consider whether federal courts may adopt a full code of
professional conduct through other means; specifically, by invoking a
separate, independent regulatory authority. As we conclude below,
even the broadest of the three theories w.ve have identified probably
would not justify the wholesale adoption of the existing ethics codes.
B. Inherent Authority To Regulate Federal Judicial Proceedings
The federal courts clearly have embraced a narrow inherent
authority that encompasses the power to implement some regulation
of lawyers. 156 They have long claimed the inherent authority to
manage their proceedings, 157 including "the authority to impose
reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers."'158 This
Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 530-31 (1989) (maintaining that federal
courts, like state courts, have developed standards of professional conduct pursuant to their
inherent authority to regulate lawyers, which includes "the inherent authority of courts to admit,
suspend and disbar attorneys who practice within the jurisdiction of the court"); Jeffers, supra
note 141, at 400 (suggesting that courts' authority to establish standards of conduct is part of
their general regulatory authority over lawyers); Note, Inherent Power, supra note 141, at 800 &
n.82. Many opinions suggest that courts have broad regulatory authority over lawyers that
derives from lawyers' role as "officers of the court." See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
389 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (referring to "[t]he supervisory power of the courts over
members of the bar, as officers of the court"); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792-93
(1975).
156. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. As we will discuss presently, there is an
argument that federal courts have broad inherent authority to regulate and discipline lawyers-
which we refer to as the "independent authority to regulate federal lawyers' professional
conduct." See infra text accompanying note 316.
157. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (recognizing that federal
courts inherently possess those powers which "are necessary to the exercise of all others").
158. Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1968). Federal
courts have similar authority, derived from the same source, to sanction litigants for litigation
abuses. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)
(upholding the assessment of attorneys' fees for intentional violations of court orders or bad faith
conduct); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) ("The authority of a court to
dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an 'inherent power,'
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authority extends beyond simply punishing lawyers for violating
established law or rules of procedure. Subject to principles of
proportionality and fair notice, federal courts may sanction wrongful
litigation conduct that is not independently proscribed. 159 The
recognized authority to regulate federal proceedings arguably implies
some authority not only to identify and sanction individual lawyers'
misconduct after the fact, but also to establish advance standards
governing some aspects of lawyer behavior in federal proceedings.
1. The Case Law
The leading Supreme Court decisions recognizing the right of
federal courts to use their inherent authority to manage their
proceedings to sanction lawyers are Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.1 60 and
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper.161 In Chambers, a federal district court
shifted nearly $1 million in attorney's fees because a litigant had filed
frivolous pleadings and delayed the proceedings. 162 Recognizing that
some of the misconduct was not sanctionable under specific federal
rules, 163 the court relied on its "inherent power" to sanction fraudulent
and "bad faith" litigation tactics.1 64
In affirming, the Supreme Court noted that "the inherent
powers of federal courts are those which 'are necessary to the exercise
of all others,"' and that the inherent power has many "facets."1 65 These
include a federal court's right "to control admission to its bar," to
"punish for contempts," to "vacate its own judgment upon proof that a
fraud has been perpetrated upon the court," and to "bar from the
courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial."1 66 Likening the
district court's sanctions to these other expressions of authority, the
Supreme Court recognized inherent federal power to protect the
governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.").
159. See infra text accompanying notes 170-174.
160. 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991).
161. 447 U.S. 752, 765-67 (1980). There have been a few other Supreme Court decisions
invoking the inherent authority, but these have largely quoted and reiterated Chambers or
Roadway Express, without offering further guidance on the issues. E.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 709 n.42 (1997); Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996); Carlisle v. United
States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996); see also Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31 (discussing power of courts to
dismiss cases for lack of prosecution).
162. 501 U.S. at 40.
163. For example, it was not sanctionable under FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
164. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 42, 45.




"integrity of the courts" 167 and "to fashion an appropriate sanction for
conduct which abuses the judicial process. ' 168 The Court relied on its
earlier Roadway Express decision, in which it had recognized an
inherent power to assess attorney's fees against counsel for
"improvidently enlarg[ing] and inadequately prosecut[ing]" a federal
action. 169
Significantly, the Chambers Court noted that "the inherent
power extends to a full range of litigation abuses," 170 including "bad-
faith" conduct that is not specifically proscribed by an existing rule or
law. 171 Much of the behavior sanctioned in Chambers occurred outside
the federal court. Some of the sanctioned lawyer's tactics had no direct
bearing on the conduct of federal proceedings, 172 and other tactics even
occurred prior to the commencement of the federal litigation. 73 The
Court's conclusion that the inherent authority encompassed the power
to regulate these activities elicited two dissenting opinions.174
Even as the Supreme Court suggested the existence of
relatively broad judicial authority to sanction tactics that threaten
federal proceedings, it also recognized boundaries on this authority.
First, Chambers noted that "the exercise of the inherent power of
lower federal courts can be limited by statute and rule, for 'these
courts were created by act of Congress.' 175 Second, both Chambers
and Roadway Express held that not all arguably wrongful conduct is
sanctionable under the inherent authority. Both cautioned that
"inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion," 176
and only "in narrowly defined circumstances."'1 77 Chambers identified
a number of relevant factors, such as the "willful disobedience of a
167. Id. at 44.
168. Id. at 44-45.
169. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 756 (1980); see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-
45.
170. 501 U.S. at 46.
171. Id. at 42.
172. These included "tactics of delay, oppression, harassment and massive expense [in
discovery and pleadings] to reduce plaintiff to exhausted compliance." Id. at 41.
173. The district court imposed sanctions, in part, for an "attempt[] to deprive this Court of
jurisdiction by acts of fraud" by selling property involved in the litigation the weekend before the
court was to hear a motion for specific performance. Id. at 36-37, 41.
174. Three dissenting Justices concluded that federal courts lacked "inherent authority to
sanction a party's prelitigation conduct," id. at 61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), while a fourth
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a federal court's inherent power allowed it to
sanction lawyers for out-of-court misconduct that did not interfere with the conduct of a trial. Id.
at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 47 (quoting Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873)).
176. Id. at 44; Roadway Express, Inc v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
177. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45; Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 765.
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court order"178 and actions taken "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons,"179 while Roadway Express referred to the
sanctioned lawyer's "bad faith."180 Finally, the Court in both cases
recognized that sanctions for misconduct are subject to a principle of
proportionality. Roadway Express warned that "attorney's fees
certainly should not be assessed lightly."181 Chambers upheld the fee-
shifting sanction on the basis that it was "less severe [than] outright
dismissal." 82
Lower court decisions have acknowledged these limitations.
Although district courts have relied on the inherent power to impose a
range of sanctions, including gag orders, 183 fines, 184  and even
dismissals, 85  they have not treated all wrongful conduct as
sanctionable. Most cases approving sanctions have involved violations
of practice rules or litigation orders requiring parties to comply with
specific directives. 186 In part because of the need to provide fair notice,
the courts have avoided sanctioning conduct not explicitly proscribed
by a rule, statute or prior court order, except where the conduct was
undertaken in bad faith or otherwise obviously improper.' 87 The courts
also have limited the exercise of inherent authority to conduct that
has threatened the judicial process in some way-a consideration that
may have played a role in Williams.88 In exercising inherent
178. 501 U.S. at 45.
179. Id. at 45-46.
180. Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 766.
181. Id. at 767.
182. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45.
183. E.g., Paul E. Iacono Structural Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 439 (9th Cir.
1983).
184. E.g., United States v. Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 2000); cf. Gamble v. Pope &
Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1962) (overruling a fine imposed by a district court).
185. E.g., Schwarz v. United States, 384 F.2d 833, 836 (2d Cir. 1967).
186. E.g., Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 886, 888 (5th Cir. 1968)
(sanctions imposed for disobeying order regulating pretrial procedures); Gamble, 307 F.2d at 733
(overruling fine imposed under the inherent authority for lawyers' failure to follow pretrial order
governing litigation procedures).
187. E.g., Glatter v. Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995); Zambrano v. City of Tustin,
885 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1989). On the question of whether a sanction can be imposed
absent bad faith or an improper purpose, compare Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir.
1993) (concluding that Roadway does not extend "the 'bad faith' requirement to every possible
disciplinary exercise of the court's inherent power, especially because such an extension would
apply the requirement to even the most routine exercises of the inherent power," and upholding
sanctions against a lawyer who suggested that a potential witness not testify for opposing party)
with Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a district court may not
sanction an attorney for recklessly making a false statement of law or fact unless it is "coupled
with an improper purpose, such as an attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings in one case
in order to gain tactical advantage in another case").
188. See supra text accompanying notes 110-111.
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authority, the courts have relied on such factors as the need to
"manage [their] calendar[s] and the courtroom,"18 9 to "impose order,
respect, decorum, silence, and compliance with lawful mandates,"190
and to maintain "order and preserve the dignity of the court."191
Likewise, lower federal courts have recognized that sanctions
imposed under the inherent authority must be proportional to the
misconduct in question. For example, in Flaksa v. Little River Marine
Construction Co., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overruled
a district court's dismissal of a litigant's claim because of an attorney's
"failure to meet his responsibilities at every stage of this
proceeding." 192 The Court of Appeals held that the sanction was
excessive in light of the fact that the litigant's claim itself was not
"vexatious or fictitious" 193 and that the litigant was not personally
responsible for the lawyer's dilatory behavior. 194 The court recognized
the availability of a range of sanctions to enable courts to "keep
litigation on congested dockets moving,"195 but reasoned that judges
should first resort to the least severe sanctions necessary to
implement the interest in judicial administration and "the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases."1 96
2. Inherent Authority as a Basis for Establishing Standards of
Conduct
To what extent does the theory of limited inherent authority
independently justify general rules of professional conduct?' 97 It is
reasonable to assume that there is an inherent power to protect
federal proceedings through the issuance of rules that is coextensive,
or the same in nature, as the power to protect federal proceedings by
189. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2001); Seltzer, 227 F.3d at 42; see
also Titus v. Mercedes Benz, 695 F.2d 746, 749-50 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussing the inherent
authority of the district court to impose sanctions for failure to prosecute); Schwarz, 384 F.2d at
835-36 (upholding a dismissal for failure to prosecute); West v. Gilbert, 361 F.2d 314, 316 (2d
Cir. 1966) (same).
190. United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1993).
191. Zambrano, 885 F.2d at 1478.
192. 389 F.2d 885, 886 (5th Cir. 1968).
193. Id. at 889.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 888.
196. Id. at 887-88 n.3 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)).
197. It begs the question to assume that federal court adoption of local state professional
rules insulates the rules from attack. There must be a basis for the adoption. See MCMORROW &
COQUILLETTE, supra note 19, §§ 801.02, 806.01 (noting limits on federal courts' rule-making
power and statutory power to discipline attorneys). If congressionally delegated rule-making
authority cannot support the adoption, it must be justified by resort to a separate theory of non-
delegated federal authority.
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punishing individuals who commit misconduct. 198 At the very least,
federal courts should be able to identify in advance particular conduct
that would be sanctionable under the inherent authority. 199 Arguably,
they also should be able to adopt rules restricting conduct that harms
judicial proceedings but for which notice would be necessary before a
lawyer could be sanctioned. 200 In this context, regulation by rule
merely serves to provide notice; it is not expanding the category of
conduct encompassed by the recognized principles governing inherent
authority.
As a substantive matter, we have seen from the inherent
authority cases involving sanctions that any exercise of the recognized
inherent power should focus on conduct that affects the courts' ability
to operate or that threatens the sanctity of the judicial process. The
limits on judicial authority have been based on the recognition that
not every instance of disrespect for a judge or a court rule rises to the
level of a true threat to the court's ability to operate.20 1 The more
attenuated from actual in-court litigation activities the misconduct is,
the less it prevents courts from accomplishing their business.
How do these considerations bear upon the use of inherent
authority to develop rules of lawyer conduct?20 2 Initially, one can posit
that the inherent power provides little basis for courts to implement
regulation that is designed to further interests unrelated to judicial
198. Well prior to the promulgation of the Rules Enabling Act, the United States Supreme
Court stated that federal courts "have authority to make and establish all necessary rules for the
orderly conducting [of] business in the said courts." Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128
(1864); see also David W. Pollak, Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the
Judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 619, 633-36 (1977) (asserting that the inherent authority
includes the authority to set rules).
199. Examples might include willfully lying to the judge or knowingly offering false
testimony.
200. Examples might include intentionally failing to disclose controlling adverse authority or
intentionally misleading a court by failing to correct the court's false assumption encouraged by
the lawyer.
201. See, e.g., Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1968)
(overruling dismissal for, inter alia, lawyer's failure to appear at pretrial conference on the basis
that the sanction was too drastic). In considering whether and what kind of sanctions may be
imposed, courts have considered such factors as the significance of the misconduct, its
willfulness, and the availability of alternative sanctions. See, e.g., id. (noting that dismissal is
generally only permitted after a "clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff'
and proposing alternative sanctions).
202. It does bear mention that the reasoning supporting the inherent power-that its
exercise may be necessary to protect the legal system-applies equally to clients and attorneys.
See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50-51 (1991) (applying sanctions imposed under
the inherent authority to the litigants themselves). Courts therefore may be authorized to
develop rules based on the inherent authority that would apply to participants in federal
proceedings other than the lawyers.
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administration-including the interests in protecting third persons,20 3
preserving the image of the profession,20 4 maintaining the bar,20 5 and
providing public service. 20 6 At their core, 20 7 such regulation has little
to do with judicial administration. 208
In contrast, judicial regulation can easily be justified under
this theory when it is directed at conduct that threatens the fair and
efficient resolution of judicial proceedings. For example, rules
requiring lawyers to expedite litigation and requiring candor to the
tribunal are geared to facilitating the functioning of the courts. 20 9
Other requirements governing advocacy, 210 such as rules governing
trial publicity211 and lawyers as witnesses, 21 2 promote the fairness of
203. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1983) ("[A] lawyer shall not
knowingly.., make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person .. "); id. R. 4.3
("When [a] lawyer knows or reasonably should know that [an] unrepresented person
misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
correct the misunderstanding);" id. R. 4.4 ("[A] lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person ... ").
204. E.g., id. R. 7.1 ("A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services.").
205. E.g., id. R. 5.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not.., practice law in a jurisdiction [where doing so
violates] the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction .... "), id. R. 5.6(a) (forbidding
a lawyer to "participate in offering or making... [an] agreement that restricts the right[s] of...
lawyer[s]"); id. R. 8.1-8.5 (imposing various limitations and requirements on lawyers to uphold
the dignity of the judiciary and legal profession).
206. E.g., id. R. 6.1 ("A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico
legal services per year.").
207. In particular circumstances, individual rules fitting within these categories might affect
the court's operations. For example, a public service rule that requires lawyers to accept federal
appointments when requested helps the federal courts resolve cases. See, e.g., id. R. 6.2 ("A
lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good
cause. . . ."). Similarly, a rule that requires admission to some bar may be designed, in part, to
preserve the image of the bar or to maintain the guild, but it also serves to provide competent
federal lawyers who will enable the federal courts to process cases efficiently. Cf. id. R. 5.5(a)
(requiring lawyers to abide by the rules of the jurisdictions in which they practice).
208. Thus, for example, the inherent power provides little basis for courts to implement legal
advertising rules which are designed primarily to protect the image of the bar. It is also
irrelevant to regulation that simply seeks to protect the rights of consumers of legal services in
ways that do not impact upon the actual conduct of litigation-such as prohibitions against
solicitation.
209. E.g., id. R. 3.2-3.3. Direct lies to the court, failures to appear or comply with calendar
and discovery orders, and refusals to obey litigation directives both make it impossible for a court
to control a particular case and, if visible, breed disrespect for court orders on the part of other
litigants and attorneys.
210. E.g., id. R. 3.1-3.4 (requiring lawyers to bring meritorious claims, expedite litigation, be
candid to the tribunal, and act fairly to opposing counsel).
211. E.g., id. R. 3.6 (imposing limits on extrajudicial statements by lawyers in the course of
litigation)
212. E.g., id. R. 3.7 (limiting the ability of lawyers to appear as witnesses in cases in which
they participate as lawyers).
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE LAWYERS
the process by which cases are decided. The adoption of such rules and
punishment of violations directly serves the courts' operations.
The mere fact that a rule involves litigation, however, does not
automatically mean that it is necessary to prevent conduct that
actually threatens the operation of the court. Civility rules provide an
interesting example. Some civility rules facilitate the conduct of
litigation by ensuring reasonable, trustworthy discourse among
opposing lawyers and judges. 213 But other civility rules may simply be
designed to make life more pleasant for lawyers and judges 214-a goal
that, while perhaps laudable, need not be accomplished for the courts
to conduct their business. 215
For similar reasons, one might assume that the inherent power
to protect judicial proceedings cannot support rules that address
conduct outside the courtroom. In at least some of the sanction cases,
courts of appeals have overruled district court attempts to punish
conduct in discovery and pretrial tactics that occurred outside the trial
judge's presence. 216 As we have noted, one interpretation of Williams
is that it precluded judicial regulation of federal prosecutors in such
circumstances. 21 7
Nevertheless, some rules governing out-of-court behavior can
be justified under the theory of inherent powers on the basis that the
rules promote the efficient operation of the federal adversarial
process. 218 Arguably, these rules promote the courts' ability to develop
full factual records and obtain a complete set of legal arguments. 219
This reasoning helps explain federal court implementation of a
number of advocacy-oriented professional rules, including those
213. An example of such a rule would be one that requires lawyers to speak truthfully with
one another and the courts.
214. An example of such a rule would be a prohibition against using personal epithets or ad
hominem attacks against one's adversary.
215. One court recently overlooked this distinction, assuming broadly that sanctioning
uncivil behavior is within a federal court's "inherent authority to police practitioners before it."
In re First City Bancorporation of Tex., Inc., 282 F.3d 864, 867 (5th Cir. 2002).
216. E.g., Saldana v. Kmart Corp, 260 F.3d 228, 238 (3rd Cir. 2001) (overruling sanctions for
profanity and abusive out-of-court conduct on the basis that it did not affect "either the affairs of
the Court or the 'orderly and expeditious disposition' of any cases before it" (citing Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991))); see also Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 61, 70
(D.N.J. 2001) (citing Saldana, 260 F.3d at 338, for the proposition that district courts may not
use inherent powers to sanction behavior that did not occur in their presence).
217. See supra Part IV.C.3.a.
218. Cf Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (upholding sanctions for filing frivolous pleadings and
delaying the litigation).
219. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 54-57, 54 nn. 37-40 (1991) (describing how
prosecutors and other lawyers help courts in the adversarial system).
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governing conflicts of interests, communications with opposing
clients, 220 and client confidentiality.
The extent to which these rules truly can be justified under the
inherent power depends, in part, on how far the courts are willing to
extend the underlying theory. The sanction cases employ terms such
as "essential" and "necessary" to describe the required nexus between
the punishment and the goal it is designed to serve. 221 What nexus
should be required of prophylactic standards of behavior? Rules
designed to preserve the adversary system, for example, will
undoubtedly encompass conduct that might be harmful to judicial
proceedings, but may also include some conduct that would not be
harmful enough to justify the imposition of sanctions. 222 The difficult
question for the legitimacy of judicial rules-and one the Williams
Justices may have had in mind-is when federal courts may adopt
prophylactic conduct requirements that in theory promote the
integrity of federal court proceedings, but do more than forbid
intrinsically wrongful or harmful conduct. 223
220. Most authorities interpret no-communications rules to forbid communications with
represented persons, not simply represented parties. See, e.g., Monceret v. Bd. of Profl
Responsibility, 29 S.W.3d 455, 460 (holding that the rule forbids communications with a
represented witness). Insofar as a district court no-communication rule applies to contacts with
persons who have no relationship to proceedings under a particular federal court's supervision, it
would be difficult for the federal court to justify the rule under the inherent authority; MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 2 (1983).
221. See, e.g., Scaife v. Associated Air Ctr. Inc., 100 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 1996);
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Because of
the potency of inherent powers and the limited control of their exercise, however, they must be
used with great restraint and caution. The threshold for the use of the inherent power sanction
is high. Such powers may be exercised only if essential to preserve the authority of the court and
the sanction chosen must employ 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."').
222. For example, requirements that the lawyer obtain a writing to evidence a client's
consent to joint representation, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(c) (1996), or to
evidence a client's consent to a fee-sharing arrangement, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.5(e)(2) (1983), are prophylactic requirements. In cases where clients' informed consent is
given only verbally, a lawyer's violation of the writing requirement would arguably not be
harmful enough to be sanctioned under the court's inherent power. However, a few lower courts
have held that, in unusual cases, a court may invoke the inherent authority to direct a lawyer's
future conduct simply in order to protect the integrity of the proceedings. See, e.g., Dale M. v. Bd.
of Educ., 282 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring plaintiff's attorney to return attorneys' fees
to defendant to prevent future manipulative pleadings and to "enforce ethical conduct in
litigation").
223. Courts that have invoked the inherent authority in order to preserve decorum or the
"sanctity" of the courts probably followed this reasoning: unless attorneys and litigants show
respect for the persons of judges and the courtroom setting, they are unlikely to obey substantive
rulings and procedures that are essential for judicial administration. Prophylactic professional
rules, such as Model Rule 3.5, may implement the same goals. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.5(a), (d) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not... seek to influence a judge, juror ... , or
other official by [unlawful] means" nor "engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.").
Whether federal courts could adopt, or incorporate, such rules under the rubric of the inherent
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Even under an extended rationale, the theoretical key is to
distinguish rules that truly relate to the functioning of the courts and
those that do not. Thus, rules governing confidentiality, 224 loyalty,225
and diligence 226 might be justified based on the need to protect the
adversarial process. On the other hand, it would be difficult for courts
to uphold traditional rules of professional conduct that are designed
simply to protect litigants, as clients, from harms unrelated to the
litigation.227
C. Federal Judicial Authority over Bar Admissions
A second independent federal judicial authority that the
Supreme Court has long recognized is the authority to admit and
disbar lawyers who seek to participate in federal litigation. 228 But this
power, the Court has stated, "ought to be exercised with great
caution." 229
The power to admit and disbar lawyers might imply a
subsidiary authority to dictate standards or codes of professional
conduct on which admission to the federal bar will be conditioned. But
if so, as we discuss below, both the rationale for this power and the
federal courts' cautious regard for it suggest that the subsidiary
standard-setting authority is limited at best.
authority probably would depend on whether the conduct they regulate is likely to affect judicial
administration.
224. E.g., id. R. 1.6.
225. E.g., id. R. 1.7-8 (conflict of interest rules).
226. E.g., id. R. 1.3.
227. For example, rules regulating the safekeeping of property and selling law practices.
E.g., id. R. 1.15 ("A lawyer shall hold property of clients.., separate from the lawyer's own
property."); id. R. 1.17 (imposing rules on sales of law practices). Rules governing fee agreements
also fit within this category, unless the rules are meant to insure the quality of federal
representation by attracting better quality lawyers.
228. See, e.g., Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 529-31 (1824) (upholding the suspension
of a federal attorney, with the observation that "the respectability of the bar should be
maintained, and.., its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some
controlling power, some discretion ought to reside in the Court."); see also Ex parte Garland, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 376, 381 (1866) (discussing court rule requiring an oath by lawyers that they
have never fought against the United States).
229. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); accord Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 530 ("This discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment .... ");
see also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 237-38 (3rd Cir. 2001) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22
U.S. at 531, and noting the existence of the power to discipline lawyers under the admissions
authority but noting that the power "ought to be exercised with great caution").
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1. The Case Law
In determining who may or may not appear in federal
proceedings, federal courts tend to rely on the judgment of state
courts. To avoid having to develop entirely separate admissions
criteria and procedures, most federal districts require a lawyer to be
admitted in a state court as a condition of federal admission. 230 In
some cases, they require nothing more. 231  For post-admission
misconduct, a few federal courts employ an ad hoc disciplinary system
to investigate and adjudicate allegations of misbehavior in federal
court proceedings, 232 but most federal courts simply refer allegations
of misconduct to state disciplinary authorities. 233 When a state court
suspends or disbars a lawyer who also is a member of a district or
federal appellate court bar, the federal court ordinarily will piggyback
on the state court's order and suspend or disbar the lawyer from
230. The District of Columbia is an exception. The local courts-which are themselves
federal courts-control admission to practice in the district.
231. See Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing In re Evans,
524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975), and stating that "as a practical matter, the application
process for admission before the federal district courts is generally perfunctory and pro forma.
Admission to the state bar is the essential determinant of professional ethics and legal
competence.").
232. This is true, for example, of the Southern District of New York and the District of
Connecticut. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. for the S. Dist. of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d
Cir. 1995) (reversing sanctions imposed pursuant to findings of a "Committee on Grievances for
the Southern District of New York"); In re Grievance Comm. of the United States Dist. Court,
847 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing discipline imposed after inquiry by a "Grievance
Committee which was comprised of practitioners from the District of Connecticut"). In some
cases, a district court before which misconduct occurs itself conducts the necessary hearing and
imposes a sanction rather than referring the matter to a disciplinary body. See, e.g., Harlan v.
Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1261 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding the district court's authority to sanction a
lawyer directly for violating a disciplinary rule); Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801 (6th Cir.
1914) (affirming an order of a district court, following a hearing, disbarring an attorney for
various misconduct, including libeling state judge, causing illiterate client to sign baseless
pleading, and obtaining improper default judgment and finding that state court's readmission of
attorney had no bearing on the federal admission decision); In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (N.D. Cal.
1897) (disbarring an attorney, following a hearing, for seeking employment in lawsuit adverse to
former client). See generally MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 19, § 806.02[21-[3]
(providing examples of various district court approaches to implementing discipline).
233. See, e.g., In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that federal discipline
was imposed only after the matter was referred to state disciplinary officials and they failed to
take action); In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 88-90 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing a district court rule
according deference to state court disciplinary decision); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 369
(7th Cir. 1992) (referring a question of prosecutorial misconduct to the state disciplinary
committee). See generally Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 77-91 (1995) (describing mechanisms
for disciplining federal prosecutors); Note, Disbarment in the Federal Courts, 85 YALE L.J. 975,
977 (1976) (describing "disciplinary rules" in the various federal districts).
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federal practice as well. 234 The Supreme Court has made clear,
however, that this deference to state admissions and disbarment
decisions is a matter of choice. Federal courts need not, and possibly
may not, defer automatically. 235
In the seminal case of Theard v. United States,23 6 attorney
Theard was disbarred by the state of Louisiana based on criminal acts
he had committed 20 years earlier.237 At the time of that offense,
Theard was eighteen years old and suffering from "a condition of
mental irresponsibility so pronounced that for years he was in an
insane asylum under judicial restraint."238 After recovering, he
practiced law for six years without incident. 239 The United States
Supreme Court held that the state court's subsequent judgment of
disbarment was "not conclusively binding on the federal courts,"240
and that the federal district court had erred in automatically
disbarring Theard based on the Louisiana judgment.241 The Court's
later decision in In re Ruffalo confirmed that "[t]hough admission to
practice before a federal court is derivative from membership in a
state bar, disbarment by the State does not result in automatic
234. This is true whether the state imposed sanctions for conduct in federal proceedings or
for other misconduct. See, e.g., Greer's Refuse Serv., Inc., v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 843 F.2d
443, 447-48 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding a district court's reliance on state disbarment to impose
federal disbarment); Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68-69 (D.N.J. 2001) (authorizing,
in theory, the revocation of a lawyer's federal admission, but finding that the district court
exceeded its authority in the case at issue); see also Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801, 807-13
(6th Cir. 1914) (upholding disbarment, following hearing in district court, for publishing false
statements about a state judge, bringing a fraudulent state court lawsuit, misleading a judge,
causing an illiterate client to sign a baseless pleading, and obtaining a default judgment for fees
against an uncomprehending client).
235. See Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1917) (holding that a federal court may rely
on a state's finding that a lawyer should be disbarred unless some procedural infirmity in the
state proceedings is evident); accord In re Sassower, 700 F. Supp. 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); see also
Elliott E. Cheatham, The Reach of Federal Action over the Profession of Law, 18 STAN. L. REV.
1288, 1291 (1966) ("The authoritative source of the right to practice before federal courts is
federal law .... [T]he fact that the federal courts ordinarily make membership in a state bar a
prerequisite ... and treat disbarment of a lawyer by a state court as reason for an order to show
cause why he should not be disbarred by the federal court. .. means only that the federal court
borrows and makes use of the state court action for its purposes, not that it must follow state
action.").
236. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
237. Id. at 279 (noting that Theard had "forged a promissory note and collected its
proceeds").
238. Id. at 280.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 282.
241. Id. at 282-83.
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disbarment by the federal court. Though that state action is entitled to
respect, it is not conclusively binding on the federal courts."2 42
Theard has several implications for the exercise of admissions
authority by the federal courts. First, Theard illustrates that the
essence of the federal power is the independent ability to determine
who is, is not, or is no longer qualified to practice before the federal
judiciary. This determination logically requires consideration of two
questions: whether the applicant is able to render competent
representation to clients in federal proceedings and whether the
applicant will do so subject to applicable legal and ethical restraints.
In resolving the latter question, the courts typically have
focused on the applicant's "moral character,"243 including whether the
applicant is law abiding and honest. They have also relied on the
applicant's past conduct as an expression of character and thus as a
predictor of future behavior.244 Theard suggests, however, that past
wrongdoing is relevant only insofar as it suggests that a lawyer does
not presently take his legal obligations seriously or is otherwise
unfit.245
242. 390 U.S. 544, 547 (1968); see also Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1483 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("Federal courts may set reasonable standards for admission, independent of the
requirements established by coequal [state] courts."); In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d 856, 859 (4th Cir.
1984) ("The action of the Maryland Court of Appeals in admitting G.L.S. to practice is entitled to
respect in the United States District Court ... but it does not obligate that court to reach the
same conclusion."); In re Landerman, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that
federal bar admission is "exclusively the authority of this [federal] court and is not controlled by
or dependent on any action or decision of the Utah Supreme Court"), and authorities cited at
1203-04; In re Culpepper, 770 F. Supp. 366, 367.70 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that a federal
court is not "bound by the determination of the state grievance board").
243. See, e.g., In re Sarelas, 360 F. Supp. 794, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ("The prime condition for
continued membership in the bar is maintenance of the high moral character expected from all of
its members."); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94
YALE L.J. 491, 496 (1985) (questioning the use state bars have made of their assessment of
character).
244. Past professional misconduct usually has been deemed particularly relevant, on the
theory that a lawyer who has engaged in professional misconduct in the past predictably may do
so again. But the relevant conduct need not have occurred in the context of federal proceedings,
or even in the context of law practice. For example, federal lawyers have been disbarred for the
commission of criminal conduct or such other immoral conduct "as may show him unfit to be a
member of the bar; that is, as not possessing that integrity and trustworthiness which will
insure fidelity to the interests intrusted to him professionally." Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 306
(1883) (Field, J., dissenting).
245. That is one of the lessons of Theard, 354 U.S. at 280-82. In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d at 859-
60, illustrates how federal courts might implement this principle. The district court denied
admission to a convicted robber who became a lawyer in good standing in Maryland. Id. at 857.
The district court relied on a "rebuttable presumption that an applicant to this bar, who is an
unpardoned convicted felon, is not of good character." Id. at 858. Although the court of appeals
upheld the denial of admission, it did so only after concluding that the district court had done
more than rely on the fact of a state felony conviction. Id. at 860. An independent evaluation of
the underlying crime and additional facts regarding the lawyer's conduct while in prison were
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Theard's facts also suggest that federal courts should focus
primarily on a lawyer's present ability to practice competently and
ethically. Although past misconduct may give rise to a presumption
that the lawyer is unfit, other considerations can overcome the
presumption. The requirement that federal courts make
individualized determinations regarding lawyer competence and
fitness ex post has implications for the extent to which the courts can
set standards of professional conduct ex ante. It raises the question of
whether federal courts may proscribe conduct that does not invariably
establish a lawyer's unfitness to practice.
Theard is ambiguous in some respects. On one hand, the
Court's concern about Theard's present fitness to practice suggests
that a federal court should not be able to withhold the right to practice
in federal proceedings as a sanction for every type of professional or
personal misconduct. 246 Instead, disqualifying misconduct should have
to demonstrate the lawyer's lack of the requisite competence or
character, which in turn establishes a real risk that in future cases
the lawyer will not render adequate representation or will not abide
by applicable laws and rules.247
On the other hand, the Court's recognition that Theard's
situation was rare and that federal courts can presumptively rely on
the state court's determination undercuts this insight. 248 Theard
imposes no general requirement on federal courts to consider whether
the conduct for which a lawyer was suspended is indicative of
incompetence or unfitness.249 As a matter of practice, federal courts
ordinarily do not focus upon whether a state court's order of
necessary to justify the district court's conclusion that the lawyer did not possess "good private
and professional character." Id. at 859-60.
246. See Theard, 354 U.S. at 282. For example, in Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 61,
63, 65, 71 (D.N.J. 2001), the district court rejected a magistrate's recommendation that a
lawyer's pro hac vice admission be revoked for "abusive behavior" that violated the applicable
rules of professional conduct, finding that alternative sanctions, such as Rule 11 sanctions,
should have been employed to address the misbehavior.
247. See, e.g., Schlumberger Techs., Inc., v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1554 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a denial of admission pro hac vice "requires a showing of unethical conduct of such
a nature as to justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar of the district court").
248. See Theard, 354 U.S. at 282.
249. Likewise, with respect to the admission of lawyers to practice in federal court, it is well
accepted that federal courts may require an applicant first to be admitted in state court. The
federal court is under no obligation to consider whether the particular applicant, although not
licensed to practice law in a United States jurisdiction, is nevertheless qualified to do so. See,
e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 & n.3 (1988) ("Regardless of his persuasive
powers, an advocate who is not a member of the bar may not represent clients (other than
himself) in court."). See generally Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in
the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 445-54 (1993) (discussing a requirement that
lawyers must satisfy admissions standards to represent defendants in criminal cases).
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suspension or disbarment reflected a specific conclusion that the
lawyer was unqualified to practice. 250
Federal courts have invoked the admissions authority in a
variety of ways. They have used the authority ex ante to establish
general criteria for admission to practice in federal court, determine
whom to admit to the district court bar, and decide whether lawyers
who are not members of the district court bar may appear pro hac vice
in particular federal proceedings. They have also used the authority ex
post to suspend and disbar members of the district court bar,
disqualify lawyers from appearing in particular cases, and revoke
permission to appear pro hac vice.251 Because federal decisions
invoking the admissions authority are not uniform, however, there is
room for debate on the question of whether, and to what extent,
federal courts legitimately may use the admissions authority to set
standards of conduct for federal lawyers.
One clear principle is that, in deciding whom to admit to
practice or to disbar, a federal court may not act arbitrarily. 25 2 Federal
courts may test the moral fitness of applicants for admission 253 and
require them to demonstrate their legal knowledge by meeting the
standards for admission to a state bar,254 passing specialized tests, 255
250. A state's disbarment order may be designed to accomplish a variety of purposes,
including punishing the particular lawyer, deterring misconduct by other lawyers, or promoting
public respect for the legal profession. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Humanization of
Lawyers, 2002 PROF. LAW. 9 (2002) (discussing the various, sometimes conflicting, goals of
professional disciplinary agencies).
251. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
252. In an early decision, Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 13 (1856), the Supreme Court stated:
And it has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it
rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its
officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.
The power, however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the
pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the
duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion,
whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be scrupulously guarded and
maintained by the court, as the rights and dignity of the court itself.
Recent decisions are to similar effect. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)
(stating that federal courts have "power to control admission to its bar" but that it "ought to be
exercised with great caution"); In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1008 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975) (refusing to
accord a district court discretion to deny admission pro hac vice simply for "unlawyerlike
conduct" because that discretion would be "too broad and, consequently, susceptible to abuse").
253. See supra text accompanying notes 243-245.
254. See Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[E]thical doubts
are best resolved through state bar proceedings .... The basic determinants of legal and moral
competence lie with the state, not the federal, bar."). Some district courts accept admission to
any state bar as dispositive of competence, while others require membership in the bar of the
state in which the federal court is located. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 11-1(a) (requiring candidates to
be admitted to the California state bar); C.D. ILL. R. 83.5(a) (providing that lawyers admitted to
practice law in any state or the District of Columbia are eligible); E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. R. 1.3(a)
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or gaining a particular level of experience in law practice. 256 Federal
courts may not, however, impose artificial obstacles to admission.257
In Frazier v. Heebe,258 for example, the Supreme Court struck
down a district court admissions rule that required not only admission
to the state bar in which the district court was located, but also
residency in the state. The district court justified this requirement as
assuring the availability of a pool of lawyers for federal court
business.259  The Supreme Court dismissed this rationale as
makeweight, holding that the availability of lawyers could be assured
through other means and that the residency requirement had no
relevance to the main goal of admissions requirements-assuring
competence. 260
One can interpret Heebe as requiring that federal admissions
criteria bear specifically on applicants' competence or fitness to
practice before the federal court. 261 The practice of many district
courts of freely allowing pro hac vice appearances, together with
judicial decisions indicating that pro hac vice admission ordinarily
may not be denied absent genuine concerns about an applicant's
fitness, 262 confirms that the focus of admissions authority should be on
an applicant's present ability to practice. Nevertheless, the contrary
practices of other federal courts raise some uncertainty about whether
the admissions authority is so limited.263
(providing that members of the bars of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Vermont are
eligible). The more general approach is designed to assure general lawyering competence, while
the more specific approach seeks also to ensure some familiarity with state law that may become
relevant (particularly in diversity cases).
255. Thus, for example, courts and federal administrative agencies governing specialized
subject matters, such as patent and bankruptcy law, could require persons practicing before
them to satisfy the requirements of membership in a specialized bar. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 31 (2000)
(permitting the establishment of qualifications to prosecute patent cases).
256. For example, some federal courts of appeals require that lawyers have conducted a set
number of appellate arguments or have had comparable experience. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 46(a)(1)
(requiring candidates to have argued three substantive appeals, or their equivalent).
257. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645-46 (1987) (upholding the authority of federal
district courts to adopt admission rules that are "necessary to carry out [their] business," but
promising to review unnecessary and discriminatory admission requirements and ultimately
striking down the residency requirement at issue).
258. Id. at 641.
259. Id. at 644.
260. Id. at 646-47.
261. The alternative reading is that admissions criteria must simply bear a rational
relationship to some legitimate judicial interest.
262. E.g., Schlumberger Techs., Inc., v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1554 (11th Cir. 1997); In re
Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1975).
263. A number of federal district courts require, for example, that applicants be admitted to
practice law not just in some state, but in the state in which the federal court is located. Two
recent court of appeals decisions have held that this is not a necessary requirement to ensure the
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Federal court decisions regarding disbarment of federal
practitioners are similarly ambiguous. They raise at least two
questions concerning the ability of federal courts to impose discipline.
First, does the authority to disbar or suspend an attorney imply the
power to impose less onerous sanctions? Second. to what extent may
federal courts sanction lawyers for misconduct that does not call into
question the lawyer's competence or fitness?
Although some courts have relied on their admissions authority
to impose sanctions on lawyers other than suspending their federal
licenses, 264 the cases reflect a sense that the federal admissions
authority is more limited in scope than the parallel authority of state
courts and disciplinary agencies. 265 States may "punish" lawyers for a
broad array of professional misconduct 266 and may impose a variety of
sanctions that are "lesser" or different than disbarment or suspension.
Arguably, federal courts are confined to deciding the question of
whether a particular lawyer is or is not competent and fit to practice.
Under this view, the only decision they can make is whether or not to
allow the lawyer to practice, or continue practicing, before the district
competence and fitness of members of the particular federal court bar. Desilets v. Delta Home
Improvement, Inc., 291 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2002); Poole v. Smith, 222 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 2000); see
also AM. BAR ASS'N, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 33
(2001) (noting the policy adopted by ABA in 1995, which provides "[tihat the American Bar
Association supports efforts to lower barriers to practice before U.S. District Courts based on
state bar membership by eliminating the state bar membership requirements in cases in U.S.
District Courts, through amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure to
prohibit such local rules").
264. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practices Litig., 63 F. Supp. 2d 516, 524
(D.N.J. 1999) (holding that the power to control admissions includes the power to order
sanctioned lawyers to reveal information regarding their sanctions in future requests for
admission), affd in part and rev'd in part, 278 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2002); Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 166
F. Supp. 2d 61, 72 (D.N.J. 2001) (declining to revoke a lawyer's admission).
265. In Mruz, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 61, for example, a federal district court limited its own
sanctions authority. Reversing a recommendation by a magistrate that a lawyer's pro hac vice
admission be revoked for "abusive behavior" that violated the applicable rules of professional
conduct, the district court ruled that it could not impose sanctions for behavior that did not occur
in a trial judge's presence and that did not affect the "orderly and expeditious disposition of any
cases before it." Id. at 64-65, 70. The court relied, in part, on the availability of alternative
sanctions, such as Rule 11 sanctions, to counteract behavior of the type the magistrate wished to
punish. Id. at 71.
266. States can rely on a broad set of rationales for sanctioning lawyers, including the desire
to maintain the dignity of the profession generally and the general interest in preserving public
trust in the bar. See, e.g., In re Olkon, 605 F. Supp. 784, 792 (D. Minn. 1985) (noting the different
concerns of state courts in admitting and disbarring attorneys), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1379 (8th Cir.
1986); In re Mattox, 567 F. Supp. 415, 417 (D. Colo. 1983) (noting that "the Supreme Court of
Colorado must concern itself as well with the rights of members of its bar to sustain a
livelihood"), rev'd on other grounds, 758 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir. 1985); Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer
Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 73, 83-90 (2001) (discussing discipline of lawyers for
crimes totally unrelated to their practice).
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court. Thus, for example, some federal courts evidently do not believe
they have authority to fine an offending attorney in lieu of revoking
the lawyer's license to practice. 267 Other courts have been circumspect
about publicly censuring lawyers. 268
The decisions also are unclear about the types of offenses a
federal court may sanction under the admissions authority. A number
of appellate courts have overruled punishment imposed by district
judges for misconduct that occurred outside the district court's
presence, 269 such as incivility or contentiousness in the course of
discovery. 270 It is doubtful, however, that these courts meant to
267. The key cases in which district courts have considered imposing, or attempted to
impose, fines without statutory authority refer both to the admissions authority and the inherent
authority to regulate federal court proceedings discussed earlier in this Article. See supra text
accompanying note 184. Ultimately, the courts seem to have relied primarily on the inherent
authority. See, e.g., Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1989)
(overruling the imposition of monetary sanctions); Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729,
732-33 (3d Cir. 1962) (reversing a fine imposed by the district court).
Limiting federal court fining authority may well be consistent with limits on the remedial
powers of most state disciplinary agencies. Even many state courts disclaim the authority to fine
lawyers as a means of discipline. See generally MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, R. 10(A) (identifying as potential disciplinary sanctions, among others,
disbarment, suspension, probation, reprimand, admonition restitution, and assessment of costs,
but not imposition of a monetary fine). The federal decisions may simply reflect a perception on
the part of the federal courts that their sanctioning authority is no greater than that of the state
courts.
268. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the
district court's deletion of public findings of misconduct against several attorneys and reversing
the district court's order censuring one remaining attorney); cf. In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am.
Sales Practices Litig., 63 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (upholding a requirement that the sanctioned
attorneys reveal the sanctions in future applications for pro hac vice admission). There are,
however, numerous judicial decisions criticizing lawyers for misconduct that arguably is not
serious enough to merit more serious discipline. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173,
1183 (2d Cir. 1981) (1982) (noting hopefully that public criticism of prosecutorial misconduct will
cause prosecutors to change their behavior in future cases before courts find the need to reverse
convictions because of the misconduct); MCMORROW & COQUILLETE, supra note 19, §
80 7 .01[5][a] (stating that "many courts have used a written reprimand, chastisement, or
criticism in a published opinion as the first level punishment for attorney misconduct").
269. See, e.g., Schlumberger Techs., Inc., v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997)
(distinguishing cases in which sanctions were imposed for in-court misconduct). In at least some
of these cases, the out-of-court misconduct was not subject to sanction under the federal court's
inherent authority to manage its proceedings. See id.
270. See, e.g., Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a
district court's sanction for profanity towards other lawyers and abusiveness towards an expert
witness). Some of the restrictive cases emphasize the availability of alternative sanctions or
methods of regulating the misconduct in question. See id. at 238 ('"[Glenerally, a court's inherent
power should be reserved for those cases in which the conduct of a party or an attorney is
egregious and no other basis for sanctions exists .. "' (citing Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252,
1265 (3d Cir. 1995))). Independent district court authority to fine for pleading abuses, for
example, seems unnecessary to protect the sanctity of courts when Rule 11 already provides
similar protection. If the admissions authority is borne of practical necessity, its exercise seems
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suggest that all misconduct outside federal proceedings is irrelevant to
admissions issues. This view would flatly contradict Supreme Court
decisions allowing the disbarment of federal lawyers for committing
criminal acts unrelated to their professional work.271 It also would be
inconsistent with the myriad district court decisions suspending or
disbarring lawyers for conduct outside federal proceedings. 272 The
restrictive cases therefore are better explained by other factors.
The decisions may reflect a practical concern. Arguably,
efficient allocation of judicial resources militates in favor of district
courts confining themselves to adjudicating questions of professional
misconduct that can be resolved without resort to an independent fact-
finding mechanism. 273  Alternatively, the decisions may reflect
skepticism about whether federal courts have authority to sanction
misconduct that does not interfere with their ability to process
litigation with the help of competent lawyers. 274 Or the decisions may
grow out of a sense that the particular district court's sanctions were
disproportionately harsh. Finally, they may be based on the view that
misconduct not serious enough to be sanctioned by disqualification,
suspension, or disbarment simply may not be sanctioned in less
onerous ways under the admissions authority.275
misguided to the extent that Congress or other rules already identify mechanisms that
adequately deter misconduct.
271. E.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 279-80 (1957); Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265,
271 (1882).
272. See, e.g., In re Attorney Discipline Matter, 98 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding
reciprocal discipline of attorney for suborning perjury in state criminal case).
273. Such a limitation can be justified both by resort to practicality-federal courts have no
administrative fact-finding resources available-and by reference to comity-respect for the
state disciplinary mechanisms. However, the rationale may simply be that disciplinary hearings
in the course of a lawsuit are a distraction for court, the parties, and the lawyers; while the
individual district judge should refrain from judging the lawyer's conduct, a disciplinary arm of
the district court may do so.
274. See, e.g., In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d. 1560, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990) (reversing the denial of
admission on the basis of "reprehensible" conduct because a district court may not disqualify an
attorney on the basis of some "transcendental code of conduct ... that ... existed only in the
subjective opinion of the court"); Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1479-80 (9th Cir.
1989) (requiring that sanctions be limited to "mild sanctions" necessary to "control the district
bar" because of a fear that authorizing all sanctions as being lesser-included aspects of
suspension might turn a limited inherent power into dramatically expansive disciplinary
authority); Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729, 731, 733 (3d Cir. 1962) (discussing
federal courts' power to discipline attorneys under the "inherent authority" and noting that "The
effort to concentrate all that frightening power in the bench is too dangerous a potential to let
slip by clothed in such disarming language as 'simply ... an exercise in disciplinary
authority.' . . . All that 'exercise' happens to be is the first giant step in stripping a lawyer of his
independence and leaving him, his client and the latter's cause of action to the ukase of the
court.").
275. Zambrano, 885 F.2d at 1473, illustrates the federal courts' cautious approach toward
the admissions authority and their uncertainty about the precise limitations of the authority.
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2. Admissions Authority as a Basis for Establishing Standards of
Conduct
If federal courts may deny admission to, or disbar, attorneys in
order to ensure competent representation in federal proceedings, it
follows that federal courts may identify specific future behavior which,
if engaged in, would demonstrate a lawyer's incompetence or lack of
fitness. 276 Arguably, federal courts should also be able to adopt
prophylactic rules of conduct designed to achieve the purposes for
which the courts have admissions authority. 277 This authority,
however, cannot justify federal courts in adopting the full panoply of
rules contained in the existing state codes of professional conduct
Lawyers in the trial court participated in federal litigation without first seeking admission in the
specific California district in which the litigation was located. Id. at 1474-75. The lawyers were
members of two other California district court bars and apparently forgot to seek the additional
license. Id. at 1475. The trial judge concluded that the failure to seek the proper admission
meant that these lawyers were not any more qualified than an auto mechanic' to conduct a
trial," dismissed the case in the middle of the proceedings, and imposed monetary and other
sanctions on the lawyers. Id. at 1475-76.
The Court of Appeals referred both to theoretical limits on federal admissions power and to
the practical benefits inherent in federal judicial self-restraint. The Court first noted that "[tihe
power of the federal courts to sanction parties and counsel has been a subject of intense debate."
Id. at 1477. It determined that the trial court had acted under local practice rules authorized by
the Congress, but that "Congress ... did not intend to permit the federal courts to arrogate unto
themselves substantial powers over ... members of the bar," instead limiting the courts to those
sanctions necessary to "preserv[e] authority and control over the district bar." Id. at 1479.
Although the Court recognized the authority of the district court to "set reasonable standards for
admission, independent of the requirements established by coequal [state] courts," the Court
reasoned that "as a practical matter, the application process for admission before the federal
district courts is generally perfunctory and pro forma. Admission to the state bar is the essential
determinant of professional ethics and legal competence .... [Elthical doubts are best resolved
through state bar proceedings." Id. at 1483. Because there had been no showing that the lawyers
had acted in bad faith, the Court of Appeals reversed the punishment imposed by the district
court as exceeding both the court's statutory and inherent admissions authority. Id. at 1484-85.
276. See Note, supra note 233, at 977 & n.20 (noting "district courts which have promulgated
substantive criteria for disbarment or suspension from practice").
277. See In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir. 1975) (asserting the "unquestioned
principle" that federal courts have "the power both to prescribe requirements for admission...
before that court and to discipline attorneys who have been admitted to practice"). In other
words, just as federal courts may adopt admissions criteria that indicate the lawyer's competence
and fitness, they may condition ongoing membership in the federal bar on conformity with
standards of conduct that promote competent, lawful representation. See Whitehouse v. United
States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R. I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1356 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that "the
greater power of disbarring attorneys for unethical behavior necessarily includes the lesser
power of erecting reasonable prophylactic rules to regulate perceived abuses by attorneys
appearing before the court"). But, as noted earlier, one can make an argument based on Theard
that the power to disbar for misconduct after-the-fact on an individualized basis does not imply
the power to proscribe particular conduct categorically before-the-fact. See supra text
accompanying notes 245-247.
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because many of those rules serve values unrelated to the reasons for
which admissions authority exists.
What kinds of district court rules of professional conduct does
the admissions authority support? At most, the admissions authority
can justify rules that focus on excluding from practice lawyers who are
(1) incompetent, (2) unwilling or unable to follow the rules and
procedures that are part and parcel of the federal adversarial legal
system, or (3) of a character (e.g., dishonest or lawless) that would
lead the lawyer to disregard professional obligations to the legal
system, clients, or others.
Thus, for example, federal courts should be able to maintain
regulation that forbids incompetent behavior. Such regulation might
include rules requiring lawyers to meet filing deadlines, render legal
services effectively 278 and diligently,279 and carry out their clients'
lawful objectives. 280
The admissions theory probably also justifies rules directed at
conduct that reflects a lack of the requisite "character" to practice law;
for example, rules proscribing dishonest or unlawful behavior 281 and
conduct that is otherwise unworthy of public or client trust.282 Two
different rationales support this type of regulation. 283 First, lawyers
who lack moral character are less likely to abide by court
requirements or to serve their clients' interests well and, in these
failings, are likely to prove incompetent.2 84 Second, a federal court's
agreement to admit a lawyer implies a corresponding ability and
willingness of the lawyer to respect the court and bring a sense of
dignity to the court's proceedings. 285 By definition, lawyers who are
lawless, dishonest, or untrustworthy will fail in this regard. 286
278. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.4 (1983).
279. E.g., id. R. 1.3.
280. E.g., id. R. 1.2.
281. E.g., id. R. 8.4.
282. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 46(b)(1)(B) (2002) (providing for suspension or disbarment from a
federal court of appeals bar for "conduct unbecoming a member of the court's bar").
283. A third plausible rationale is a contractual theory. In others words, by accepting federal
admission, lawyers agree to abide by court rules and accept the possibility of sanctions for
violating the rules. Because this theory essentially is a tautology that would justify any
regulation of lawyers however inappropriate, courts have disfavored it. See Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607-09
(1990) (discussing the argument that lawyers give up their constitutional rights by agreeing to
become members of the bar).
284. See In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing approvingly and enforcing
a local district court rule providing that "[d]iscipline by way of suspension or disbarment shall
not be imposed unless any such violation be of sufficient gravity as to evidence a lack of moral
fitness for the practice of law").
285. See Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R. I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1361
(1st Cir. 1995) (citing Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957), for the proposition that
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Many traditional ethics rules fit within the category of
character rules. Some proscribe deceitful conduct.28 7 Others proscribe
knowing violations of court rules, rules of procedure, criminal law or
other existing legal standards.288 Still others forbid conduct toward
clients that breaches the lawyer's fiduciary duties to clients and thus
betrays the client's trust.28 9
Somewhat more difficult to justify under the admissions
authority is the category of rules that promote effective representation
generally, but which do not necessarily identify conduct that
inherently disproves an offending lawyer's competence or fitness. For
example, conflict of interest rules typically prohibit lawyers from
taking on clients not only when a lawyer will invariably render
inadequate representation, but also when the risk of incompetence or
disloyalty is high. 290 Federal courts might be able to justify such rules
under the admissions authority on the basis that they protect client
interests and help maintain the aggressive advocacy necessary for the
admission is a "privilege burdened with conditions"). There are several links between deceit and
incompetent representation in the federal adversarial system. First, clients deceived by their
lawyers are unlikely to cooperate with the lawyers further, rendering the lawyers less effective.
Second, the clients are likely to demand new counsel when the deceit is discovered, which in turn
will delay or otherwise affect the federal litigation in a negative way. Finally, lawyers who
engage in deceit towards other lawyers or third parties involved in litigation may undermine the
process of fact finding, discovery, negotiations, and settlement upon which the federal court
depends.
286. One related justification might be that clients and observers of the legal system who
learn that the lawyer is dishonest or a law breaker will (1) lose respect for the lawyer and
therefore disregard his advice or instructions that they comply with the federal court's mandates,
or (2) will lose respect for a federal legal system that employs lawyers of bad character,
particularly as appointed counsel. While the lawyer's character itself might not prevent the
lawyer from providing aggressive advocacy, its impact on other participants in the litigation
system might undermine the federal adversarial process. Whether this rationale justifies
regulation resting on the admissions authority probably depends on several, semi-empirical
factors: whether clients and observers are likely to learn of the lawyer's transgressions, how
likely they are to be affected in a way that affects the adversarial process, and how significant
those effects will be.
287. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (1983) (prohibiting false statements
and certain failures to disclose); id. R. 3.4(b) (prohibiting the falsifying of evidence); id. R. 4.1
(requiring "truthfulness in statements to others"); id. R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting "conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation").
288. E.g., id. R. 3.4(a) (regulating interference with access to evidence); id. R. 3.4(c)
(prohibiting knowing disobedience to "obligation[s] under the rules"); id. R. 3.4(d) (prohibiting
delay and frivolous discovery requests); id. R. 3.5(a) (prohibiting attempts to influence decision
makers unlawfully); id. R. 8.4(b) (forbidding "a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness").
289. E.g., id. R. 1.1 (requiring competent representation); id. R. 1.3 (requiring diligence); id.
R. 1.6 (requiring the maintenance of client confidences).
290. See Green, supra note 149, at 104 ("Conflict rules avert these harms by forbidding the
representation under circumstances giving rise to an unreasonably high risk that such harms
will occur.").
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operation of the federal system. But one could also argue that their
nexus to assuring competence is too attenuated to be justified on this
rationale. 291
Would the admissions authority justify a district court's
blanket adoption of federal rules forbidding any arguably wrongful
conduct-for example, by incorporating a comprehensive ethics code
based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or on a state
code? 292 Perhaps the best justification for such regulation is the
argument that the admissions authority implies an authority to
discipline, 293 which in turn implies the authority to establish
disciplinary rules. Both halves of the syllogism are questionable,
however.
If one views disbarment as punishment, 294 there is some logic
to the claim that the power to disbar implies the power to impose
lesser punishments for misconduct in federal proceedings. 295 Arguably,
however, disbarment is not punishment, but simply a regulator's
ruling expressing doubts about a particular lawyer's qualifications for
a license. Moreover, even if one accepts that federal courts possess
disciplinary authority and that the applicable standards of conduct in
federal proceedings are a matter of federal law, it does not logically
follow that the courts, rather than Congress alone, have the power to
establish the underlying rules of conduct.
There might be a different way to rationalize federal district
court power to establish broad rules of professional conduct. We have
already noted that a federal court may refuse admission to or disbar
an attorney who has previously been suspended from practice in his
291. Of course, the rules might be justifiable under one of the other authorities discussed
elsewhere in this Article.
292. As noted earlier, many federal courts have adopted comprehensive ethics codes in this
manner without specifying whether they have invoked rule-making authority or some non-
delegated authority. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
293. Some federal courts seem to have acted on the belief that they possess disciplinary
authority. See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1994) ("A district court's authority to
discipline attorneys admitted to appear before it is a well-recognized inherent power of the
court."). This belief may underlie the occasional implementation of disciplinary mechanisms to
resolve allegations of misconduct in federal litigation. See authorities cited supra note 232.
294. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (stating, in dicta, that "[d]isbarment,
designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer").
295. Even if one accepts the notion that the power to suspend implies the power to impose
lesser sanctions, the issue of what sanctions are lesser can be complex. For some lawyers, for
example, a fine might be more onerous than suspension or disbarment-as in the situation in
which a lawyer who is appearing pro hac vice has no intention of appearing in future cases before
the particular court and has little invested in the case. Other lawyers, in contrast, would regard
suspension or disbarment as far more onerous, both because it implies that the lawyer's
misconduct was serious and because other jurisdictions might rely on the suspension or
disbarment as the basis for imposing a similar sanction.
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home state, regardless of whether the lawyer's predicate misconduct
reflected a lack of competence. 296 Arguably, this highlights a power of
federal courts to rely on non-competence-based rules, and therefore
authorizes them to craft such rules themselves.
The problem with the argument is that it is circular. It would
justify any district court rule that a state could also adopt, simply
because of a federal court practice of deference that is based largely on
convenience. 297 Moreover, it seems contrary to the Theard premise
that federal and state authority is separate in nature.298
In sum, it seems doubtful that the admissions authority allows
federal courts to adopt comprehensive ethics codes. At best, the
admissions authority can be invoked either to forbid conduct that
casts doubt on a lawyer's competence or fitness to practice or to
establish standards of conduct designed to promote competent
representation within the federal adversarial scheme of litigation.
Various traditional ethics rules governing lawyer advocacy fall
close to the line separating proper exercises of the admissions
authority from improper attempts. For example, some federal courts
have adopted rules that forbid federal lawyers from communicating
with represented persons concerning the subject of the
representation. 299 Several rationales have been offered for no-
communication rules.300 One of these-that the forbidden conduct
interferes with the represented person's interest in receiving the
benefit of his lawyer's competent representation 30'-does relate to the
court's interest in maintaining competent representation in federal
296. See supra text accompanying notes 248-250. Some rules that state disciplinary agencies
enforce are designed to assure competence, but others focus more on such goals as maintaining
the image of the bar. See generally Zacharias, supra note 116, at 225-39 (discussing the various
functions of professional rules).
297. See supra text accompanying note 88.
298. A final, equally circular argument is that federal courts may discipline lawyers for
violating rules of professional conduct that the courts set because the violations demonstrate an
unwillingness of the lawyers to follow judicial mandates, and thus shows them to be unfit to
practice. Again, it stands to reason that lawyers should only need to abide by the rules that are
lawfully adopted. They should be able to challenge the application of those rules that are ultra
vires.
299. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that local
district court rule adopted California's no-communication rule); United States v. Hammad, 858
F.2d 834, 841 (2d Cir. 1988) (suppressing conversation obtained by prosecutor from represented
person); cf. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding a no-
communication rule, but finding it was not violated).
300. These rationales are all described in STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEM OF LAW AND ETHICS 110 (6th ed. 2002).
301. See, e.g., Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1084
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that the no-communication rule "preserves the integrity of the attorney-
client relationship.").
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litigation and, concomitantly, the ability of clients to trust and use
their attorneys. 302 If adopted with this purpose in mind, a no-
communication rule can be justified by resort to the admissions
authority. Other rationales for no-communication rules, however, have
less to do with assuring competent lawyers or the integrity of federal
litigation. 303
It also is important to note that some ethics rules that could
not be adopted under the admissions authority might legitimately be
adopted under the federal courts' separate inherent authority to
manage federal litigation. 304 For example, a rule restricting trial
publicity is difficult to justify on the admissions theory that it
promotes competent representation or ensures trustworthy or law-
abiding counsel. Indeed, the rule furthers the courts' interests even at
the possible expense of the client's interest in optimal
representation.3 0 5  Nevertheless, trial publicity regulation can be
justified under the inherent authority as being necessary to protect
the integrity of judicial proceedings.
Many traditional state ethics rules, however, are
unsupportable under either theory of federal judicial authority. Legal
advertising rules, for example, traditionally have sought to preserve
302. One aspect of this theory is that the lawyer may, through derogatory comments,
undermine the represented party's faith in his own lawyer. Another is simply that the client may
give up certain rights or positions that his lawyer could use to his benefit.
303. In part, the no-communication rules prevent represented persons from making unwise
decisions to provide information to opposing counsel or to surrender legal rights-decisions that
their lawyers would discourage if they were present. See, e.g., Papanicolaou, 720 F. Supp. at
1084 & n.7 (noting that the no-communication rule protects clients from being disadvantaged by
opposing lawyer in contexts where a client would benefit from his or her lawyer's advice or
assistance). From a federal court's perspective, it may actually benefit the federal truth-seeking
process to have represented witnesses (or even defendants) provide information that their
lawyers could help hide. The federal court that uses the admissions authority for the purpose of
protecting clients from making such unwise decisions thus would need to establish separately
that direct communications with the represented person say something about the offending
lawyer's character that truly is relevant to the reasons why a lawyer should not be allowed to
practice in federal court. See Grievance Comm. for the S. Dist. of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 651
(2d Cir. 1995) (noting that a no-communication rule "raises policy issues that should be resolved
against the backdrop of federal law enforcement concerns," and Congress or the Supreme Court,
rather than a district court, should evaluate the balance between the represented person's
interests and those of the defendant).
304. See supra Part V.B. The reverse, of course, may also be true.
305. In other words, effective representation may entail making statements to the media that
influence public opinion favorably to the defendant but that risk tainting the jury pool and
thereby undermine the judicial interest in maintaining the integrity of the proceedings. See, e.g.,
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(recognizing the importance of influencing public opinion as an aspect of a criminal defense).
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the dignity of the legal profession,3 6 a goal which has little to do with
competence or the integrity of judicial proceedings. Similarly,
although some rules governing attorney's fees are directed at
dishonest or illegal conduct, 30 7 many attorney fee regulations are
based on a desire to maintain the profession's image and to enable the
guild as a whole to maintain a stable, relatively high fee structure free
from public oversight. 308 These rules might conceivably be adopted
under some other rationale, but not under the admissions or inherent
authorities. 309
When federal courts adopt such rules by incorporating state
standards or the ABA model code in its entirety, the courts may be
implementing policy decisions that have little to do with the
authorities upon which they rely. Federal court rules that track state
ethics rules, for example, certainly reinforce state authority to control
professional misconduct. Nevertheless, for our purposes, it is fair to
conclude that federal court power to adopt comprehensive ethics codes
simply because states have done so is not a natural or inevitable
corollary to the courts' basic ability to regulate who may appear before
them.
D. Federal Court Authority To Regulate Federal Lawyers'Professional
Conduct
The previous sections identified two possible sources of federal
judicial authority to set standards of lawyer conduct: inherent
306. For a history of advertising regulations, see the authorities cited in Fred C. Zacharias,
What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of
Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 974-75 nn.8-13 (2002).
307. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (1983) (prohibiting the use of
contingency fees in particular cases because of the risk of too great a conflict between the
lawyer's interest and the client's); id. R. 1.15(a)-(b) (requiring client funds to be held in separate
accounts and regulating how lawyers may take their fees).
308. E.g., id. R. 1.5(a) (requiring fees to be "reasonable," not simply what the market will
bear); R. 1.5 cmt. (requiring lawyers "to offer the client alternative bases for the fee").
309. For example, federal courts overseeing contingent fee arrangements appear to do so
based on a broad regulatory authority like that described in Part V.D, infra. See, e.g., Mitzel v.
Westinghouse Elec. Co., 72 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding federal district court's
incorporation and application of state court contingency fee rule, and noting that 'contingency
fee agreements are of special concern to the courts,' . . . and fall within a court's 'supervisory
powers over the members of its bar"' (citations omitted)); Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d
137, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1973) (upholding district court local rule authorizing district court to
establish a contingent fee schedule for use in personal injury actions involving seamen, pursuant
to district court rule-making authority "and the inherent power of such courts to take
appropriate action to secure the just and prompt disposition of cases," and noting that "in its
supervisory power over the members of the bar, a court has jurisdiction of certain activities of
such members, including the charges of contingent fees").
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authority to regulate federal proceedings and the authority to admit
and disbar lawyers. A third possible theory is simply that federal
courts have the same independent authority to regulate lawyers that
state courts possess. 310 In other words, they have an intrinsic power
not only to admit, disbar, and sanction lawyers, but also to set
standards governing professional conduct in general.
When discussing federal court regulatory authority generally,
the courts have been less than careful in identifying which sources of
authority they have relied upon. The courts sometimes have discussed
the inherent and admissions authorities in the same case.311 When
they seem to have implemented a broader authority, they at times
have used the term "inherent authority" to refer to more than the
limited power that the Supreme Court has clearly recognized. 312
Similarly, the term "supervisory power" alternately has meant
supervisory power over the criminal justice system, 313 supervisory
power over federal litigation, 314 and supervisory authority over
310. See MCMORROW & COQUILLEI1E, supra note 19, § 806.01[2] (citing Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991), for the proposition that federal courts "have the inherent
power to discipline attorneys. Court authority is rooted in the policy that attorneys are officers of
the courts, and as such, the courts necessarily are vested with the authority to control attorney
conduct in order to ensure the proper administration of justice."); id. § 807.01 (asserting that
"this inherent power to control the conduct of both litigants and attorneys is quite flexible and
'staggeringly broad"').
311. See supra note 267.
312. See, e.g., In re First City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc., 282 F.3d 864, 867 (5th Cir. 2002)
(upholding as a proper exercise of a bankruptcy court's "inherent power to impose sanctions" the
imposition of a $25,000 fine for a lawyer's "obnoxious" and "uncivil" behavior); Comuso v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 267 F.3d 331, 333, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2001) (upholding a district court's
award of fees and costs, pursuant to its "inherent power to discipline attorneys appearing before
it," as sanction for lawyer's "outrageous conduct" in litigation, including profane behavior during
court recess and other out-of-court misbehavior); In re Bailey, 182 F.3d 860, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[Regulation of attorney behavior is an inherent power of any court of law and falls within the
discretion of such court."); Mroz v. Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Chambers,
501 U.S. at 46, for the proposition that "the inherent power extends to a full range of litigation
abuses"); Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating
that the "inherent power of a court to manage its affairs necessarily includes the authority to
impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers practicing before it"); cf. Stern
v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 13 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[D]istrict
courts have inherent power arising from the nature of the judicial process, and this power
extends to certain types of rulemaking."); Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1479-80
(9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the district court's view that the admissions and inherent authority
permit district courts to impose a broad range of sanctions for a broad range of attorney
misconduct).
313. See, e.g., United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985) (referring to
"supervisory authority" to describe court's "authority to formulate procedural rules in its
administration of criminal justice").
314. See, e.g., United States v. Rhynes, 206 F.3d 349, 369 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[A] district court's
supervisory authority over the conduct of a trial" permits it to take "measures to prevent the
tailoring and fabrication of witness testimony, such as prohibiting witnesses from discussing the
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lawyers generally. 315 The following section will employ the universal
term "federal court authority to regulate lawyers' professional
conduct" to refer to the type of broad general ethics authority that
federal courts seem occasionally to have implemented under different
labels. 316
Once again, language in Theard v. United States31 7 provides
the starting point for the argument in favor of broad regulatory power.
Theard equates the federal courts' authority with that of the state
courts: "The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and
the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of
their officers, among whom ... lawyers are included."318 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals has cited Theard as confirmation of federal
courts' general authority to establish standards governing federal
litigators' conduct. 319 Other courts, however, have assumed that
case with one another, from discussing the case with any attorney, and from reading transcripts
of the trial testimony of other witnesses.").
315. See, e.g., In re Kramer, 193 F.3d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) ("There is little question but
that district courts have the authority to supervise and discipline the conduct of attorneys who
appear before them."); United States v. Ming He, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 28744, at *29 (2d Cir.
1996) (forbidding prosecutors from debriefing cooperating defendants without their lawyers
present, and explaining: "we are enforcing our general supervisory authority over members of
the bar of this Court, lawyers who are at the same time United States attorneys"); Cole v.
Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994) ("It is well-established that ordinarily
'the control of attorneys' conduct in trial litigation is within the supervisory powers of the trial
judge,' and is thus a matter of judicial discretion."); O'Connor v. Jones, 946 F.2d 1395, 1399 (8th
Cir. 1991) ("We note and confirm that a federal district court has the authority to supervise
attorneys practicing before it."); Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1984) (reviewing
disqualification order and starting "with the generally accepted rule that the district court has
the duty and responsibility of supervising the tonduct of attorneys who appear before it");
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Whenever an allegation
is made that an attorney has violated his moral and ethical responsibility, an important question
of professional ethics is raised. It is the duty of the district court to examine the charge, since it
is that court which is authorized to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar.").
316. Cf. Kelly J. Applegate, G. Heilemen Brewing v. Joseph Oat Corp.: The Use of Inherent
Judicial Power Within the Limitations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 J. CONTEMP. L.
159, 165-69 (1991) (analyzing whether inherent authority supports requirements that parties to
federal litigation submit to alternative dispute resolution); Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial
Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1805 (1995) (arguing in favor of a
broad inherent authority to manage federal cases).
317. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
318. Id. at 281.
319. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349,
1359-60 (1st Cir. 1995) ("In contrast [to the supervisory power], the power of a court to regulate
the conduct of attorneys appearing before it derives not from a need to remedy or deter violations
of defendants' rights, but from the professional relationship between the court and attorneys
appearing before it."); id. at 1364 (citing Theard for the proposition that federal district courts
have "inherent power.., to promulgate and enforce" rules of professional conduct); see also
United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir. 1972); Woodson v. Am. Cystoscope Co. of
Pelham, 335 F.2d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 1964) (stating that federal courts "may resort to disciplinary
action against [an] erring attorney"); In re Olkon, 605 F.Supp. 784, 789 (D.Minn. 1985)
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Theard's language applies only to the admissions power and have
suggested that the federal and state judiciaries do not have the same
interests in regulating lawyers more generally. 320
Even under the Theard rationale, jurisdictional considerations
would probably limit the broad regulatory authority. The differences
between federal and state interests321 and differences in the nature
and volume of matters that the two court systems oversee 322 imply
logical restrictions on the type of conduct that federal courts can
regulate. A state license to practice law, for example, authorizes a
lawyer to render all legal services in the state. Because most states,
through their constitutions or otherwise, have delegated the role of
supervising lawyers to the judiciary, state courts must regulate the
full range of lawyers' professional conduct-including relations with
clients and prospective clients, work in business transactions, and the
rendering of advice outside the litigation context.
In contrast, when federal courts admit lawyers, the lawyers are
admitted for the sole purpose of appearing in federal litigation. Even
assuming that the federal courts' authority is analogous to that of
state courts, the setting suggests a substantive limitation: federal
judicial standards of conduct apply only to lawyers' work in or relating
to federal court proceedings and, therefore, should relate in some way
to the work of federal trial lawyers.32 3
Accordingly, federal courts should not be able to adopt rules of
professional conduct unrelated to federal court interests. Beyond that
(justifying the application of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility to federal court
proceedings on the basis of "our general supervisory authority to regulate attorneys appearing
before this court"), rev'd on other grounds, 758 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir. 1985); cf. In re Sarelas, 360
F. Supp. 794, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (asserting authority to suspend an attorney who
"demonstrate[s] a gross failure of professional judgment and character").
320. See, e.g., In re Olkon, 605 F. Supp. at 792 ("[C]ourts of limited jurisdiction have a
slightly different concern in maintaining discipline than a state bar authorizing the general
practice of law .. "); In re Mattox, 567 F. Supp. 415, 417 (D. Colo. 1983) (noting the state courts'
interest in protecting "the rights of members of its bar to sustain its livelihood"), rev'd on other
grounds, 758 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir. 1985).
321. State courts, in addition to assuring competence, may be interested in safeguarding the
image and reputation of the bar and the ability of lawyers to earn a living, in preventing
competition by nonlawyers, and in safeguarding other interests that have nothing to do with
maintaining competent lawyering in litigation before them.
322. See In re Mattox, 567 F. Supp. at 417 (arguing that the "demands of the federal practice,
the volume of documents and case files confronting each judge and the vicissitudes and
complexity of federal litigation" specially justify federal regulation to ensure "the trustworthiness
and honor of the [federal] bar").
323. This suggests that, under any theory, federal courts may not establish rules of ethics
that have no bearing on lawyers' federal litigation activities, such as a rule restricting the sale of
a law practice. Cf. Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a federal court may regulate misconduct by a lawyer who has not appeared in
federal litigation, but who nevertheless has affected federal proceedings).
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limitation, however, the Theard theory is expansive. 324 It would allow
federal courts to adopt standards that promote any of the purposes
that traditionally justify ethics rules, including the protection of
clients, court processes, and third parties. In all likelihood, it would
permit federal courts to adopt most of the existing state ethics
provisions that have relevance to federal litigation. 325
Do federal courts actually have this broad regulatory
authority? The best argument in favor of it is historical. Common law
courts have always set standards of professional conduct for lawyers
in proceedings before them. As a consequence, federal courts never
have doubted their authority to regulate federal litigators, including
the power to define misconduct in federal proceedings. They have set
standards implicitly by sanctioning, disqualifying, or disbarring
lawyers and have set standards explicitly by adopting local rules of
professional conduct and by making pronouncements about how
lawyers before them must behave in the future. These courts, in most
cases, have not needed to identify the basis for their actions. 326
A second argument supporting broad regulatory authority is
one of necessity. 327 If federal courts cannot regulate federal litigators'
professional conduct, aspects of that conduct that traditionally have
been subject to professional regulation may become immune from
supervision by any body. Federalism concerns arguably prevent state
324. For constitutional reasons, the broad regulatory authority would have one limit shared
by all forms of non-delegated authority: it may not be exercised arbitrarily. See, e.g., County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) ("We have emphasized time and again that
'[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government,' whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, or in the
exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental
objective." (citations omitted)). Due process has been held to foreclose arbitrary decision making
by courts as well as administrative agencies. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994)
(noting that when "absent common-law procedures would have provided protection against
arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the proceedings
violative of due process").
325. Standards of prosecutorial conduct, like the one at issue in Williams, might be among
the hardest to justify under this theory, because they are not applicable to all lawyers. They
seem less like rules of ethics designed to regulate the conduct of the bar than like rules of
procedure designed to regulate the government in criminal cases.
326. For example, in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), the Court held that trial
courts have power in criminal cases to disqualify criminal defense lawyers who have conflicts of
interest and identified various judicial interests that justified their exercise of this power, but did
not explicitly identify the source of the trial courts' power. For commentary on the decision, see
Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly"- How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal
Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1989). Often, obvious justifications exist. In the rule-
making situations, for example, many local rules could be defended by resort to congressionally
delegated rule-making authority.
327. Cf. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (noting that federal courts
possess those inherent powers which "are necessary to the exercise of all others").
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rules of professional conduct from applying to federal litigation unless
the rules are incorporated by federal action.328 Government attorneys,
including federal prosecutors, may claim that their federal status
preempts state regulation of them. 329 Even if state regulation were
deemed to apply in federal court, not all federal litigators are subject
to the same state's rules, which would potentially lead to an uneven
playing field for opposing litigators. 330
Congress, of course, could adopt federal rules of professional
conduct.331 Arguably, however, federal courts are in a better position
to regulate lawyers, since they have the expertise borne from
experience overseeing federal litigation. 332 Moreover, the judges before
whom the conduct in question occurs are in the best position to judge
the impact of that conduct on the court's proceedings. 333
On the other hand, the source of this broad authority to
establish standards governing all professional conduct in federal
proceedings is unclear. Federal courts traditionally have been
328. Grievance Comm. for the S. Dist. of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1995)
(noting that even when the federal court chooses to apply state standards of professional conduct
to the work of lawyers in federal court, "well-established principles of federalism require that
federal courts not be bound by ... the interpretations of state courts"); see also Rand v. Monsanto
Co., 926 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply state ethics rule on champerty).
Application of state rules to federal proceedings was a consequence of the McDade Amendment.
See supra note 15. However, serious efforts to repeal the McDade Amendment have been
attempted since its adoption. See, e.g., S. 250, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2296, 105th Cong. (1998);
see also Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 832 n.331 (2003) (noting unsuccessful efforts of Justice Department to
repeal the McDade Amendment as part of proposed anti-terrorist legislation); cf. Paula J. Casey,
Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Why McDade Should Be Repealed, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 423
(2002) (arguing that the McDade amendment should be repealed because it "leaves the federal
government unable to respond to the needs of law enforcement and to national emergencies").
329. See Little, supra note 11, at 392 (discussing the Thornburgh Memorandum and the
potential inapplicability of state rules of professional conduct in federal proceedings, particularly
with respect to federal prosecutors).
330. Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 392. Indeed, in theory, federal litigators do not have
to be licensed by any state. Nor does a state court have to apply its ethics rules to a lawyer's
conduct in federal proceedings. Under the choice of law principles in Model Rule 8.5, disciplinary
proceedings involving alleged misconduct by a lawyer in federal court would therefore be
resolved using the disciplinary rules applicable in the federal court. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(1) (1983) ("[Tlhe rules to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in
which the court sits, unless the rules of the court provide otherwise.").
331. Zacharias, supra note 143, at 337.
332. See Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1361 (1st
Cir. 1995) (justifying a federal court rule governing attorney subpoenas on the basis that "[t]he
judges of the federal district court in Rhode Island are in a position to observe the subpoena
practices of attorneys appearing before them"); see also Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 425-
34 (discussing the expertise of federal courts).
333. See Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964) ("When an attorney appears before
a federal court, he is acting as an officer of that court, and it is that court which must judge his
conduct.").
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characterized as courts of limited jurisdiction, which may act only in
cases and on subject matters authorized by the Constitution and
Congress.33 4 Federal courts can justify the limited inherent and
admissions powers discussed earlier on the basis that their exercise is
necessary to enable the courts to operate in the matters prescribed by
the Constitution and Congress. No similar justification exists for
exercising undifferentiated ethics authority. Similarly, judicial
adoption of professional standards that go beyond protecting court
processes is a form of lawmaking. 335 Article III may require legislative
authorization before federal courts can engage in that type of
activity.33 6 Arguably, judicial lawmaking is ultra vires even with
congressional approval. 337
334. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the
Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739 (2001) (questioning "judicial invocation of
[broad] inherent power" as "clash[ing] with three principles of constitutional structure that the
Court has long endorsed"); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 1001, 1004-05 (1965) (discussing the Article III grant of power to Congress to set the
jurisdiction of the federal courts).
335. Cf. Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (Holmes, J.) ("A judicial
inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and
under laws supposed already to exist.... Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and
changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of
those subject to its power.").
336. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 334, at 739 ("The Court has never explained how the
Constitution simultaneously limits federal courts (especially as compared to Congress), yet
authorizes them to exercise broad and virtually unreviewable inherent authority."); see also
Grievance Comm. for the S. Dist. of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 651 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
some policy choices "should be made either by Congress or the Supreme Court, and not by
district courts' expansive interpretations of disciplinary rules"); cf. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1,
15 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that court's attorneys fee rule "violates the most
basic limitations on our rulemaking authority as set forth in the Rules Enabling Act"); United
States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36, 51 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (noting that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "have been upheld on the ground that they are procedural, not substantive, in nature."
(quoting Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072)).
337. Generally, federal courts are constitutionally foreclosed from making decisions in
contexts other than deciding cases and controversies-a proposition that casts doubt on their
power to set standards by rule. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (establishing the case and
controversy requirement); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 584
(1947) (explaining the advisory opinion doctrine on the basis of the dangers in judicial decision
making in the absence of a concrete case). On the one hand, this limitation has been set to the
side in the context of federal rules adopted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. The justifications
for judicial adoption of those rules may apply to rules of professional conduct as well. See
MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 19, §§ 801.01, 801.03 (discussing the use of delegated
rule-making power to justify federal judicial rules of professional conduct). Two important
caveats bear mention, however. First, there may be a meaningful distinction between allowing
courts to adopt rules of procedure and evidence and adopting substantive law standards. Second,
in adopting rules pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, federal courts arguably are exercising
Congress's functions by delegation, rather than their own, limited Article III authority. The
exercise of delegated authority may not provide support for deeming rule-making activities
legitimate under the courts' independent Article III powers.
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In discussing the recognized federal judicial regulatory powers,
a number of courts have also expressed practical concerns about the
prospect of broad federal court ethics authority. At one level, they
have worried about creating a system in which federal judges assume
traditional state functions in regulating and disciplining lawyers. This
concern is borne out of a sense of tradition and comity. 338
At a second level, the courts' qualms illustrate a fear that
federal judges exercising broad regulatory authority would be
assuming functions which they have neither expertise, information,
nor the resources to fulfill, 33 9 and which may entrench unduly on the
independence and aggressiveness of federal advocates. 340 As we have
noted, a few federal districts have taken it upon themselves to
implement procedures for enforcing ethics standards341 but, for the
most part, federal courts rely on state disciplinary mechanisms. 342 To
the extent federal courts assume the function of establishing
338. See Schlumberger Techs., Inc., v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1554 (11th Cir. 1997) (limiting
district court discretion to sanction "unlawyerlike conduct" as "too broad and, consequently,
susceptible to abuse"); In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Admission to a state
bar creates a presumption of good moral character that cannot be overcome merely by the whims
of the District Court."). Thus, numerous courts have noted the benefits of "symmetry" in federal
and state decisions regarding lawyer conduct. E.g., In re Braverman, 549 F.2d 913, 914 (4th Cir.
1976); In re Olkon, 605 F. Supp. 784, 792 (D. Minn. 1985); see also In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094,
1099 (3d Cir. 1975) (reversing a district court disciplinary decision that imposed a penalty
greater than that imposed in state proceedings); id. at 1106 (Rosenn, J., concurring) ("Unless an
exceptional reason ... justifies ... disparate treatment, its effect will ... render a grave
disservice to the public."). As a practical matter, federal courts have achieved this symmetry by
deferring to state agencies on matters of admission and discipline.
339. See, e.g., Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing
the primacy of state admission and disciplinary mechanisms); In re Abrams, 385 F. Supp. 1210,
1212-15 (D.N.J. 1974) (Cohen, J., dissenting) (focusing on both "comity" and practical constraints
to justify a rule of deference to state disciplinary decisions in the absence of exceptional
circumstances), rev'd, 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1975). In other words, states maintain entire
agencies through which they develop files on lawyers, investigate misconduct, and process
allegations of misconduct.
340. See, e.g., Gamble v. Pope, 307 F.2d 729, 733 (3rd Cir. 1962) (arguing that the exercise of
disciplinary authority "is the first giant step in stripping a lawyer of his independence and
leaving him, his client, and the latter's cause of action to the ukase of the court"); Petition of
Merry Queen Transfer Co., 269 F. Supp. 812, 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that the federal court
"should normally not depart from state practice respecting professional proprieties" because that
"would create unnecessary tension for lawyers").
341. See supra note 232 and accompanying text; see also In re Landerman, 7 F. Supp. 2d
1202, 1204 (D. Utah 1998) (referring a disciplinary matter "to the Committee of Conduct for
attorneys of this court for further proceeding under the rules of this court").
342. See, e.g., In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 287 (1959) (noting that the federal courts do "not
conduct independent examinations for admission to the bar. To do so would be to duplicate
needlessly the machinery established by the states whose function it has traditionally been to
determine who shall stand to the bar."); see also MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 19, §
806.01 (asserting that federal courts "have both statutory and inherent power to discipline
attorneys").
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standards, pressure may develop for them to enforce those standards
as well. 343
Theard alone does not resolve the issue of whether broad
federal court power to regulate federal lawyers' professional conduct
exists. Williams provided the Supreme Court with its best opportunity
to date to put the question to rest, but the Court failed to seize the
opportunity. The tendency of lower federal courts to speak of the
various types and levels of federal judicial authority as if they were
the same has only served to confuse the issue further.
VI. CONCLUSION: WILLIAMS, INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY,
AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS
Earlier, this Article raised the question of whether the district
court in Williams could have justified its grand jury disclosure
requirement on some basis other than the supervisory authority over
the criminal justice system that the Tenth Circuit relied upon. The
Article also posited that the resolution of that question might vary,
depending on whether the district court implemented the disclosure
requirement through case-by-case decision making or by a rule resting
on authority not delegated by Congress. Part V has set forth three
possible sources of non-delegated federal judicial regulatory authority,
along with their potential limitations.
The Williams Court did not address these sources of authority
directly. But if one interprets the decision either as being confined to
its facts 344 or as implementing a narrow holding concerning the
supervisory power over the criminal justice system,345 Williams leaves
open the possibility of alternative district court approaches, including
rule making not specifically authorized by Congress. While several of
the other interpretations of Williams suggest limitations on judicial
regulatory power that may refer to specific alternative sources of
authority, the reality is that we cannot know what the Supreme Court
had in mind-if, indeed, the Justices agreed on any approach. If
Williams demonstrates nothing else, it is that the issues remain very
much open to debate.
The outcome in Williams is subject to the many interpretations
that this Article has identified precisely because the scope of federal
343. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 434 (discussing the pressures towards federal
enforcement of federal ethics standards); Fred C. Zacharias, Reform or Professional
Responsibility as Usual: Whither the Institutions of Regulation and Discipline?, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2003) (discussing the future of professional discipline).
344. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 90-95.
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judicial authority to regulate federal lawyers is so uncertain. In recent
years, much of the legal wrangling has involved the regulation of
prosecutorial ethics, not only in the grand jury context as in Williams,
but in many other contexts as well.346 Nevertheless, the potential
impact of the alternative sources of regulatory authority reaches well
beyond the prosecutorial ethics realm. The core issue of whether
federal courts may adopt comprehensive ethics codes, for example, has
never been resolved. If federal judicial regulatory authority over
lawyers is rooted in the inherent authority to regulate court processes
or in the admissions power, comprehensive local ethics codes probably
go too far. They can only be justified-and then only partly-if federal
courts have the broad, undefined "independent power to regulate
federal lawyers" that this Article has discussed. 47
Likewise, if the various alternative sources of authority justify
some kinds of ethics rules but not others, that too has significant
ramifications. On the one hand, it supports federal court attention to
those specific subject matters. On the other hand, it may militate in
favor of congressional action, in one of two ways. First, if the
legitimate focus of the courts is limited, perhaps Congress should turn
its own attention to those aspects of lawyers' conduct that federal
courts have no business regulating and adopt its own preemptive
rules. Second, and conversely, to the extent that broader federal
judicial attention-to professional conduct is appropriate, the existing
limitations on federal judicial authority suggest the need for
congressional authorization of judicial standards. The current
congressional mandate that federal courts apply state ethics codes to
federal prosecutors has limitations 348 that might well be avoided
through well-crafted, congressionally guided judicial rule making. 349
Whether federal courts attempt to set professional standards
through local rules or through pronouncements regarding appropriate
conduct in individual decisions, the scope of their authority remains
uncertain. The nub of the uncertainty is that federal courts typically
have adopted rules of professional conduct (either incorporating state
codes or formulating their own) on the assumption that their rule-
making authority authorizes them to do so. In individual cases like
Williams, courts similarly have announced standards of conduct on
the assumption that their discretion is unfettered.
346. See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 384.
347. See supra Part V.D.
348. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 6, at 215-24 (criticizing the McDade Amendment).
349. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 473-74 (encouraging congressional
authorization of judicial rule making on legal ethics matters).
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Why have there been so few challenges to these exercises of
authority? One explanation may be that the rules are not enforced,
except perhaps in those limited situations in which the judicial power
is at its height.35 0 Another explanation may be a sense by affected
practitioners that any legal challenge would be handicapped by the
reality that the deciding court will be the same as the initial rule
maker, and that this court will also be the decision maker in the
underlying case in which the standard of conduct is applied. This
explanation finds support in the fact that most recent challenges to
judicial regulatory authority have been brought by the government,
which is less likely to fear individual courts than private litigants.
Even in those cases, the government has sometimes surrendered
rather than appealing to the highest levels. 351
Whatever the reasons, challenges may yet be brought, with
dramatic ramifications if they succeed. Surprisingly, the strongest
proponents of broad federal judicial rule making seem to take the
position that if federal courts may not adopt particular rules of
conduct under the general rule-making authority, they may not do so
using alternative means. 352  This Article's analysis calls that
conclusion into question.
And what is the precedential value of Williams? By being
unclear about the basis for the Williams decision, the Justices in the
majority accomplished several things. At the simplest level, the Court
avoided serious analysis of the hard issues we have discussed. The
Justices may have sought this result because the parties and lower
courts failed to raise the issues adequately or to eliminate the district
350. Thus, for example, we find no cases involving federal judicial enforcement of legal
advertising rules, but do find cases involving the application of no-communications rules against
prosecutors in situations in which courts can claim their regulatory authority derives from the
recognized supervisory power over the criminal justice system. See, e.g., United States v.
Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 841 (2d Cir. 1988).
351. An interesting recent example is United States v. Sanchez, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7636
(S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2003), withdrawn as moot by 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9726 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
2003). In that case, the prosecutor received and opened a letter sent to him by a represented
defendant awaiting trial on narcotics charges. Id. at *2. The defense objected to the
government's proposed introduction of the letter in evidence, arguing that the prosecutor had
violated the no-communication rule by opening and reading the letter. Id. at *3. The government
initially litigated the question, but then thought better of doing so. Id. at *4. Unaware of the
government's decision not to offer the letter, the district court ruled that the prosecutor's opening
of the letter comprised a "communication" within the meaning of the rule, and suppressed the
letter as a remedy. Id. at *8, 11. Rather than challenging the decision on appeal, the government
called the district court's attention to correspondence withdrawing its intent to offer the letter
and asked the court to withdraw its decision as moot, which the court then did.
352. See MCMORROW & COQUILLETrE, supra note 19, at § 807 ("The inherent power, however,
does not provide an independent authority for local rules of attorney conduct that exceed the
scope of the rulemaking power of the federal courts").
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court's disclosure requirement without making new law. More likely,
however, the decision masks at least some disagreement within the
Court concerning the appropriate rationale for the outcome. Through
various concurring and dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia has made
clear his opposition to the type of broad inherent 353 or supervisory
judicial powers that some other Justices have recognized in the
past.354
The consequence is a decision that is simultaneously
nondispositive and far-reaching. It provides a basis for future claims
all along the spectrum-that the Court limited judicial regulatory
authority, that it recognized such authority, or that it said nothing
about it. Virtually every one of the alternative interpretations of
Williams that this Article has identified fits, tracks, or relates to one
of the alternative theories of judicial regulatory authority.355
Accordingly, the Article has attempted to parse out the key questions
regarding the federal judicial regulatory authority-questions to
which courts and commentators have tended to assume the answers.
353. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
disagree, however, with the Court's statement that a court's inherent power reaches conduct
'beyond the court's confines' that does not 'interfer[e] with the conduct of trial."'); United States
v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe,
however, that district courts possess no power, inherent or otherwise, to prosecute contemners
for disobedience of court judgments and no derivative power to appoint an attorney to conduct
contempt prosecutions."). Compare Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
(holding that the inherent authority of district courts to regulate their proceedings does not
extend to granting untimely motion for judgment of acquittal), with id. at 437 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there is a "power 'inherent in every court of justice so long as it retains
control of the subject matter and of the parties, to correct that which has been wrongfully done
by virtue of its process."' (quoting Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 249 U.S.
134, 146 (1918))).
354. Compare Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 264 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Even less do I see a basis for any court's 'supervisory powers to discipline the
prosecutors of its jurisdiction,' except insofar as concerns their performance before the court and
their qualifications to be members of the court's bar." (citations omitted)), with United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 67-69 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with Justice Scalia
regarding the scope of the courts' supervisory authority).
355. Thus, for example, the interpretation that the Court was distinguishing the district
court's ability to regulate in-court conduct from its ability to affect out-of-court conduct suggests
that the Court may have been thinking of cases involving the inherent authority (which
sometimes have made this distinction), but not the admissions authority. Similarly, the
interpretation focusing on the remedy of dismissal of an indictment might refer, alternatively, to
inherent authority cases limiting judicial sanctions or the notion that the admissions authority
should rarely be used to penalize the litigants. Separation of powers concerns-a basis for yet
another set of interpretations-are most germane to the supervisory power over the criminal
justice system, but could in particular cases pertain to all the sources of authority. In contrast,
the notion of deference to state regulation has been featured most prominently in cases involving
the exercise of the admissions authority. And the distinctions between ad hoc standards and rule
making are relevant, but perhaps apply differently to each of the alternative sources of power.
1378
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE LAWYERS
Similarly, with respect to the specific issue of whether a federal
court has the authority to adopt the Williams disclosure requirement
through alternative means, this Article again has suggested that the
issue remains open. But the Article's analysis suggests that a
framework for resolving it is possible.
A judicial requirement of disclosure in the grand jury cannot be
justified by resort to the inherent authority, for what occurs in the
grand jury room has little to do with what will occur in court.
Similarly, regulating the inner workings of the grand jury is not
"necessary" for judicial administration or the maintenance of the
federal adversary system-as a post-indictment disclosure
requirement might be. Only the argument that failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence produces frivolous indictments that eventually
will burden the court suggests any significant connection to regulable
federal proceedings, and this connection seems attenuated.
The admissions rationale provides no better justification for a
general Williams type of disclosure rule. Failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence says nothing about federal prosecutors'
character, competence, or fitness to practice, unless the nondisclosure
is used to mask actual deceit. 356
Thus, if the authority to adopt a Williams standard for
prosecutorial conduct exists on some independent basis, it can only be
justified by resort to the final, expansive theory of regulatory
authority. Prosecutorial activities before federal grand juries do hae
a sufficient tie to federal litigation to fall within the broad rubric that
that theory contemplates. Even if the federal courts have this
authority, however, it is important to note that its exercise may still
be "trumped" by separation of powers or other institutional
concerns.
35 7
Finally, what about local district court rules that incorporate
comprehensive standards of conduct? If the congressionally delegated
rule-making process ultimately is judged to authorize generalized
ethics provisions, then obviously the district courts need not invoke
independent non-delegated powers. But the argument that at least
some traditional rules of professional conduct are more than rules of
356. In a particular case, the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence may be an aspect of a
course of prosecutorial conduct intended to mislead the grand jury to indict an individual in the
absence of probable cause. In that event, the conduct would be sanctionable under various
sources of authority, including the Hyde Amendment and ethics rules based on Model Rule
3.8(a). But it cannot always be assumed that a prosecutor who withheld exculpatory evidence
knew that probable cause was lacking, or that in actuality there would have been an insufficient
basis for an indictment if all the facts were considered.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
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evidence, practice, or procedure is strong.358 To the extent that the
congressionally delegated rule-making authority does not provide
sufficient support for comprehensive local ethics rules, such rules
must rest on the non-delegated powers. As this Article has discussed,
all of the alternatives encompass limitations on the types of standards
that federal courts may adopt.359 Even under the broadest of the
theories, federal judicial regulation must focus fairly specifically on
the competence or fitness of federal attorneys or on some specific
aspect of federal litigation.
We have seen that courts and commentators have attributed
far more to the Williams decision than a close reading of the case
allows. They have also tended to analyze federal judicial power to
regulate federal lawyers superficially, by resort to broad statements
about the majesty or limitations of the federal courts. 360 In leaving the
issues unresolved in Williams, the Court missed perhaps its best
opportunity to provide guidance regarding federal judicial regulation
of professional ethics and federal judicial supervision of federal
litigation more generally. This Article has highlighted some of the
most significant questions and their ramifications, in the hope that
the courts, commentators, and even Congress will come to better
understand the complexity of the issues.
358. See, e.g., Note, supra note 233, at 988 (questioning an appellate disbarment rule on the
basis that it exceeds the authority to make rules governing "practice and procedure").
359. See supra text accompanying notes 202-208, 224-227 (inherent authority); 299, 306-309
(admissions authority); 321-325 (intrinsic power of state courts).
360. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 334, at 799 (criticizing scholars for their inadequate
analyses of the judicial approaches to the exercise of broad inherent authority).
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Fundamental Retribution Error:
Criminal Justice and the Social
Psychology of Blame
Donald A. Dripps 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1383 (2003)
The concept of blameworthiness plays a central role in criminal
law. Deontologists and utilitarians alike agree that the criminal sanc-
tion should rarely, if ever, apply to an actor who caused harm without
some subjective awareness of wrongdoing. Research in social psychol-
ogy, however, suggests that human beings are predisposed to overstate
the role of personal, versus situational, factors in explaining negative
outcomes.
It would seem to follow that officials (legislators, judges, and
jurors) are likely to overstate the personal responsibility of individuals.
This tendency has both positive and normative significance. Descrip-
tively, it may help to explain why in many contexts, such as the felony-
murder doctrine and prevailing (narrow) understandings of defenses
based on insanity, intoxication, and necessity, present doctrine pun-
ishes absent culpability. It may also help to explain converse doctrinal
anomalies, such as provocation, duress, and the "abuse excuse," which
exculpate blameworthy actors. In these instances the defense invites
the law to blame another human being, rather than impersonal situ-
ational factors.
Normatively, the tendency to attribute outcomes to persons
rather than situations suggests a systemic tendency to overblame. This
risk poses a significant challenge to most popular theories of punish-
ment, but it is an especially strong point against mandatory forms of
retributivism. As applied by observers predisposed to overblame, man-
datory, retributivism is likey to inflict punishment the theory itself for-
bids.

